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The U.S. Supreme Court’s Characterizations
of the Press: An Empirical Study
ABSTRACT
The erosion of constitutional norms in the United States is at the center
of an urgent national debate. Among the most crucial of these issues is the
fragile and deteriorating relationship between the press and the
government. While scholars have responded with sophisticated
examinations of legislators’ and the President’s characterizations of the
news media, one branch of government has received little scrutiny—the
U.S. Supreme Court. This gap in the scholarship is remarkable in light of
the Court’s role as the very institution entrusted with safeguarding the
rights of the press. This paper presents the findings of the first
comprehensive empirical examination of the Court’s depictions of the
press. We tracked every reference to the press by a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice in the Court’s opinions since 1784. We coded these references to
the press (broadly defined by the Justices themselves) for the presence of
common frames and for whether the frame was conveyed with a positive,
negative, or neutral tone. The results of our study reveal troubling trends
at the Court, with widespread implications for any discussion of
contemporary press freedom. We find that there has been a stark
deterioration in both the quantity and quality of the Court’s depictions of
the press across a variety of measures. Our data show that the Justices are
now less likely to talk about the press than they were in the past, and that,
when they do, it is more often in a negative light. At this crucial moment,
when we have seen the risks of executive and legislative branch attacks on
the press, our study finds that the U.S. Supreme Court is not pushing
back. The study also reveals a substantial correlation between ideology
and the Justices’ attitudes toward the press. It likewise illuminates the
press-characterizing behaviors of the most and least press-friendly
Justices of all time and of the currently sitting Justices, providing insights
into patterns that might be expected in the years to come.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The erosion of constitutional norms in the United States is at the
center of an urgent national debate. Among the most crucial of these
issues—brought into sharp focus during the Trump Administration—is
the fragile and deteriorating relationship between the press and
government institutions.1 Many scholars and commentators have
*
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The authors thank Maria Eliot, Savanna Nolan, Emily Nuvan, Lydia Owens Rytting, Joseph
Scarborough, and Jake Shapiro for their research assistance. They also thank Christina Boyd
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Ryan Black for his expertise and assistance. This article also benefited from feedback on
drafts from the participants of the Yale Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, the
Duke Law School Faculty Workshop Series, the Rocky Mountain First Amendment
Workshop, and the Arizona State University Law School Colloquium.
1 See Sarah Repucci, Freedom and the Media 2019 – Media Freedom: A Downward Spiral, Freedom House, (“[P]ress freedom has come under unusual pressure in the United
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responded by examining the impact of the President’s and legislators’
depictions of the news media and by emphasizing the potential dangers
that arise when those characterizations become increasingly negative.2
Throughout this discussion, however, there has been little scrutiny of the
views of the press emanating from another powerful governmental
institution—the United States Supreme Court. While there is increased
awareness of the perils of the political branches’ negative attitudes toward
the press, the judiciary is often still assumed to be the same reliable
protector of press rights as it was half a century ago.3 The validity of this
assumption, however, is entirely unclear, in large part because there has
been almost no substantive investigation of the Court’s views on the role
of journalism in our society.
Determining the Court’s view of the press can be a surprisingly
difficult task. This is because the Court has recognized virtually all of the
press’s substantive protections under the umbrella of general free speech
protections for all speakers, rather than in press-specific rulings. Almost
everything we know about the Justices’ views on the value and
constitutional importance of the press, therefore, has been communicated
instead through press-praising dicta—frequent declarations by the Justices
about the unique roles of the press in our democracy. In other words,
many of the press’s claims of constitutional importance hinge not on
States, the world’s leading democratic power. . . [The] continual vilification of the press
has seriously exacerbated an ongoing erosion of public confidence in the mainstream media.”) (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral); Peter L. Strauss, Eroding “Checks” on Presidential Authority – Norms, the
Civil Service, and the Courts, 94 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 581, 588-89 (2018) (discussing
how U.S. politicians “intimidate the free press” and “use the very institutions of democracy – gradually, subtly, and even legally – to kill it.”) (citations omitted); Stephen J.
Wermiel, Freedom of the Press: Challenges to This Pillar of Democracy, INSIGHTS ON L.
& SOC., Mar. 26, 2019, at 21; RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301, 1351 (2017); Erik Wemple, Deven Nunes’s
anti-media rant, annotated, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/19/devin-nuness-anti-media-rant-annotated/; Ben MathisLilley, Rep. Jim Jordan Complains That CNN is Doing “Fake News” by Interviewing People About Him, SLATE, July 11, 2019, accessible at https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/jim-jordan-tweet-cnn-interviews-fake-news.html.
2 See generally Michael M. Grynbaum, After Another Year of Trump Attacks, ‘Ominous
Signs’ for the American Press, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2019 (explaining details regarding
President Trump’s increased attacks on the press and the negative implications for the
press). See also Press Release, New York Times Co. Statement of A.G. Sulzberger,
Publisher, The New York Times, in Response to President Trump’s Tweet About Their
Meeting (July 29, 2018), accessible at https://www.nytco.com/press/statement-of-a-gsulzberger-publisher-the-new-york-times-in-response-to-president-trumps-tweet-abouttheir-meeting/ (noting that President Trump’s “language was not just divisive but
increasingly dangerous.”).
3 See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American
Press, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 567 (2017) (describing these assumptions).
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substantive law, but on the Justices’ rhetoric about the significance of the
press. Understanding the Justices’ characterizations of the press—as well
as any changes in the tone of those characterizations over time—is
therefore of heightened importance. If the Justices are no longer depicting
press freedom as a public good worthy of the strongest constitutional
status, then the press’s ability to fight for legal rights and protections may
suffer.
This article thus asks the simple questions: What is the Court’s
perception of the press and is that perception changing over time? The
answer to these questions sheds light on whether we can count on the
Court to act as the backstop for strong American-style press freedom
values, even in the face of political or public backlash. At this critical
moment, when both a changing media landscape4 and the increased need
for investigative and accountability journalism5 push issues of press
freedom squarely into the spotlight, a closer look at the realities of the
Court’s characterizations of the media is especially needed.
This article presents the findings of the first comprehensive empirical
examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s depictions of the press. In our
study, we tracked every reference to the press by a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice in the Court’s opinions since 1784. We coded these references to
the press (broadly defined by the Justices themselves) for the presence of
common frames related to the press, such as its historical value, its effect
on government, its protection from regulation, its impact on individuals’
reputations and privacy, and its trustworthiness and ethics. We also
recorded whether each frame was conveyed with a positive, negative, or
neutral tone.
4

Kristen Hare, The Coronavirus has Closed More Than 50 Local Newsrooms Across
America. And Counting, POYNTER (Aug.20, 2020),
https://www.poynter.org/locally/2020/the-coronavirus-has-closed-more-than-25-localnewsrooms-across-america-and-counting/ (noting that roughly 1,800 newspapers have
closed since 2004); Bigger and Bigger They Grow, UNC HUSSMAN SCHOOL OF
JOURNALISM AND MEDIA https://www.usnewsdeserts.com/reports/expanding-newsdesert/loss-of-local-news/bigger-and-bigger-they-grow/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2020)
(noting the “largest 25 newspaper chains own a third of all newspapers, including twothirds of the country’s 1,200 dailies”). Michael Barthel, Newspaper Fact Sheet, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, MEDIA & NEWS (July 9, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/factsheet/newspapers/; Tom Sites, About 1,300 U.S. Communities Have Totally Lost News
Coverage, UNC News Desert Study Finds, POYNTER (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2018/about-1300-u-s-communities-have-totallylost-news-coverage-unc-news-desert-study-finds/.
5 Andreas Adriano, Investigative Journalists Play a Key Role in Bringing Corruption to
Light, INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING WORKSHOP (September 12, 2019),
http://investigativereportingworkshop.org/news/investigative-journalists-play-a-key-rolein-bringing-corruption-to-light/ (interviewing Charles Lewis, an investigative journalist
who says “[w]e need more discussion, reporting, understanding, and accountability by all
these entities”).
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The results of our study reveal troubling trends with widespread
implications for any discussion of contemporary press freedom. Our data
show that the Court’s view of the press has been starkly deteriorating in
both quantity and quality across a variety of measures. At this crucial
moment, when we have seen the risks of a real-world rise in executive and
legislative branch attacks on the press, our study finds that the U.S.
Supreme Court is not pushing back. These important findings provide
significant evidence that the press’s legal standing may be on dangerously
shaky ground.
As an initial matter, our data show that the Court is simply
referencing the press far less frequently than it did a half century ago. This
includes a notable decline in even the Court’s most basic recognitions of
the work performed by journalists as communicators of information to the
American public. We likewise find that the Justices today are
acknowledging the bare existence of a constitutional right to “freedom of
the press” significantly less often than in prior eras. In fact, the modern
Supreme Court is increasingly less likely to talk about the press or press
freedom at all, regardless of the context for the discussion.
Our data also reveal a parallel decline in the overall tone the Court
uses to characterize the press. Once again, regardless of how or why the
Justices are discussing the news media, the relative percentage of their
positive references about the press has decreased notably over the last
several decades. In other words, not only is the Court talking about the
press much less often; when it does talk about the press, it is doing so in
more negative ways.
Our data likewise provide valuable insights into the Court’s more
specific depictions of the press and show the concrete ways those
depictions have changed over time. When our tonal data is investigated
against the backdrop of our specific press-characterization frames,
powerful subtrends emerge—all pointing in the direction of a U.S.
Supreme Court with a decreased respect for and a devalued
characterization of the press. The Court’s usage of frames that are
typically employed positively, such as those tracking the Court’s
references to press freedom’s historic role or the press’s effect on
democracy, is on the decline. At the same time, the frames that tend to
skew toward negative characterizations, like the frame recording the
Court’s discussions of the press’s impact on individual privacy and
reputation, not only comprise a higher percentage of the Court’s morerecent press mentions but are even more likely than before to carry a
negative tone.
Combining our data with the information available through the
Supreme Court Database leads to additional discoveries. By analyzing
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both the frequency and tone of an individual Justice’s press references, we
assign each Justice a “Press Support Score” and identify the most and
least press-friendly Justices throughout history. We also map our data
onto the Justices’ Martin-Quinn ideology scores, finding a substantial
correlation between the Justices’ political ideologies and their positive or
negative attitudes toward the press.
In Part II of this Article, we provide an overview of the limitations of
prior scholarly research about the Court’s views of the press and press
freedom and explain why a large-scale empirical investigation of the
Court’s characterizations of the press was needed. In Part III, we outline
the methodology of our study. Our findings follow, starting in Part IV
with an examination of the decline in both the frequency and tone of the
Court’s press references. In Part V, we consider the impact of political
ideology on the Justices’ discussions of the press. In Part VI, we compare
individual Justices’ views of the press, including identifying the most and
least press-friendly Justices of all time and discussing potential emerging
patterns among the Court’s current Justices.
All told, our data suggest that any hopes that the judiciary can be
trusted to be a savior of press freedom in America might be misplaced.
Indeed, our empirical analysis of the Court’s characterizations of the press
over time suggests just the opposite. The U.S. Supreme Court is giving
much less consideration to the press and its freedom than it did a
generation ago, and increasingly does not think well of it.

II. THE LIMITED RESEARCH ON THE COURT’S VIEW OF THE PRESS
Fully capturing the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of the press can be a
tricky endeavor. This is largely because, when considering the substantive
protection of expressive freedoms under modern First Amendment
doctrine, the Court focuses almost exclusively on speech rights and not on
press freedom. While the First Amendment includes explicit textual
protections for both the “freedom of speech” and the “freedom of the
press,” the Court has decided almost all of the press’s legal rights through
the lens of general free speech rights for all speakers—not as press-specific
rulings.6 In fact, the Court today recognizes virtually no independent right

See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“[A]s a
matter of positive law, the Press Clause actually plays a rather minor role in protecting the
freedom of the press.”); Erik Ugland, Newsgathering, Autonomy, and the Special-Rights
Apocrypha: Supreme Court and Media Litigant Conceptions of Press Freedom, 11 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 375, 392 (2009) (observing that the Supreme Court has not “declared that the
Press Clause has any meaning apart from the Speech Clause.”); Sonja R. West, Awakening
the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011).
6
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or protection as arising solely from the Press Clause.7 This has been true
even when the Justices have decided cases where members of the news
media were litigants, the rights at issue were ones that are most commonly
used by the press, or the legal analysis centered on the unique functions of
the press.8 In these cases, the Court’s ultimate holding almost always has
been a broader one that applies to all speakers (not just the press) and is part
of a sweeping right of expression (not just freedom of the press).
This does not mean, however, that the Justices have not expressed
views about the importance of the free press. To the contrary, they have on
many occasions shared their thoughts about the value of the press and of
press freedom.9 But rather than recognizing explicit rights and protections
for the press, the Justices have instead turned to nonbinding dicta as the
primary means of expressing their views.10 These insights into the Court’s
attitudes toward the press have appeared in a variety of forms. Sometimes
the Justices have engaged in long and specific expositions about the press,11
while on other occasions the references were shorter and more implicit.12
There are even occasions where an insight into a Justice’s perspective on

7

See C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing
Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956 (2007) (“The Court has never explicitly recognized
that the Press Clause involves any significant content different from that provided to all
individuals by the prohibition on abridging freedom of speech.”).
8 See Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729 (2014) (discussing
cases where the holdings applied broadly, but the Court was focused on the press and press
issues.).
9 See RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why it
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253 (2014).
10 See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705
(2014).
11 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the
protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve
the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The
press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.
Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And
paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of
foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation
for their courageous reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other
newspapers should be commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw
so clearly. In revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the
newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would
do.”).
12 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 467 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing
the media as “irresistibly drawn to the sight of persons who are visibly in grief.”).
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the press can be gleaned from a mere word choice in his or her description
of the facts of the case.13
Thus, the approach the Court has taken when it comes to press
freedom has been different than its typical mode of protecting constitutional
rights. It has lumped members of the press together with other types of
speakers, has cast aside unique press freedom issues, and has tended to rely
heavily on indirect praise rather than explicit protection. This makes an
investigation of the Court’s press depictions particularly important as a
substantive matter.
Some might argue, however, that these are merely distinctions without
difference, because the press is amply protected as long as First
Amendment doctrine broadly secures expressive rights more generally. To
be sure, it is hardly the case that the press has been left without
constitutional protection. Members of the press, for example, enjoy the
same robust speech rights as all speakers, such as crucial protections against
threats like prior restraints, content-based regulations, and overly broad or
vague regulations of speech. But it is both shortsighted and precarious to
assume that the press is adequately protected by a one-size-fits-all approach
to broader expressive freedoms. Members of the press are different from
other types of speakers in both the protections they need to do their work
effectively14 and the threats they face from potential government
interference.15 In fact, through its discussions of the press, the Court itself
has acknowledged that the press is distinct, because it fulfills specific
constitutional functions—gathering and disseminating information about
matters of public concern and serving as a government watchdog.16 While
the Court has often been reluctant to declare overt rights for the press, it has
nonetheless recognized the inherent value of the free press. These
recognitions, moreover, underlie key rights that are held by both the press
and the public;17 positive characterizations of the press and the press
13

See, e.g., Marcello v. United States, 400 U.S. 1208, 1209 (1970) (describing press
coverage of the arrival of a prominent figure at the airport by stating that “the press
swarmed” the passenger).
14 See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2446 (noting the
press’s needs in the context of newsgathering).
15 See id. at 2446-2447 (noting the unique concerns of the press); see also RonNell Andersen Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L.
REV. 499, 543-547 (2019) (examining the unique risks of governmental targeting of the
press as an institutional speaker).
16 See Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729 (2014) (compiling
Supreme Court precedent establishing that the press fulfills two unique constitutional
functions: gathering and disseminating news to the public and providing a check on the
government and the powerful).
17 See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 571 (2011) (exploring how a “sizable amount
of vital constitutional doctrine in this country developed as a result of constitutional cases
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function have often been central to the Court’s expansive conception of
these broadly shared rights.18
In other words, past Justices, through their press-praising dicta, have
crafted a vital support structure that bolsters the press’s constitutional
status. This structure, however, will only remain strong if the principles
behind the Justices’ characterizations are repeated, amplified, and
reaffirmed by their successors on the bench. Therefore, many of the press’s
claims of unique constitutional standing and a protected societal role—and
much of the wider judiciary’s scaffolding for approaching cases with press
specialness in mind—hinge not on substantive law, but on the Justices’
rhetoric.19
The Court’s indirect approach to press freedom means that when it
comes to constitutional protection for the press, the Justices’ words matter.
And if this rhetoric were to shift over time, either in framing or in tone, it
could have significant consequences for the press. Understanding the arc of
the Court’s attitude toward the press, therefore, is a vital tool for
determining the strength of press freedom’s constitutional status.
Yet past scholarly research about the Supreme Court’s stance on the
press and on press freedom typically has involved investigation into the
smaller collection of cases where either a news organization was a party or
where the Court reached holdings that are widely relied upon by members
of the news media. The general consensus among scholars following this
approach is that the Court’s tenor toward the press has been on the decline
over the past fifty years after hitting a high point in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s—sometimes referred to as the “Glory Days.”20 During these decades,
the Court handed down rulings in a number of important and high-profile
in which mainstream media companies, often newspapers, aggressively fought for fundamental democratic principles that had public benefits beyond the scope of the individual
[press] litigants' successes”)
18 See RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253, 270-71 (2014) (highlighting “how thoroughly connected the
Court's positive conception of the media has been to the development of wider First
Amendment doctrine in this country” and noting evidence that diminished “press characterization could threaten to impoverish a much wider body of First Amendment rights”).
19 See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705
(2014).
20 See RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253 (2014) (observing the “Glory Days” in which “the Court
went out of its way to speak of the press and then offered effusively complimentary
depictions of the media in its opinions.”); Erin C. Carroll, Promoting Journalism As
Method, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 691, 696 (2020);
Free Speech Cases May Turn into Blockbusters, ABA J., Oct., 2000, at 30 (quoting
University of Minnesota professor Jane Kirtley as “recall[ing] with fondness
‘the glory days of the 1970s and '80s, when the U.S. Supreme Court elevated
the press clause of the First Amendment to new levels.’”).
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cases that greatly favored the news media (even if the holdings themselves
applied more broadly). In New York Times v. Sullivan21 and its progeny,22
for example, the Court expanded protection for speakers against defamation
lawsuits. The Court also decided a number of key cases opening up access
to judicial proceedings, like Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia23 and the
Press-Enterprise cases.24 It was also during this period that the Court
secured the protection of speakers against prior restraints by the
government, such as in New York Times Co. v. United States (the “Pentagon
Papers” case).25 In a series of additional rulings, the Court protected the
press from liability when it published truthful information on matters of
public concern26 and protected the press’s freedom of editorial decisionmaking.27
But media law scholars also have made anecdotal observations that
the Court’s view of the press has been declining over the last several
decades—both in the number of press cases it is hearing as well as the way
it discusses the role of the press.28 In the 2010 case of Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, for example, the Court seemingly went out
of its way to describe the press as an institution on the “decline” that is
comprised of “sound bites, talking points, and scripted messages that
dominate the 24–hour news cycle.”29
The task of tracking the Court’s attitudes toward the press over time
thus faces several obstacles.30 Because of the Court’s practice of discussing
21

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See, e.g., Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1966); Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988).
23 488 U.S. 555 (1980).
24 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., (Press-Enterprise I) 464 U.S. 501 (1984), PressEnterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986)
25 403 U.S. 713 (1971); see also Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976).
26 Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Okla. Cnty.
Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, (1977).
27 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
28 See, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and
Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253 (2014); Lyrissa Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?
2012 BYU L. REV. 1819 (2012) (observing that the Roberts Court “appears to see the
‘Fourth Estate’ as little more than a self-serving slogan bandied about by media
corporations”).
29
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010); see also RonNell
Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It Matters, 66 ALA.
L. REV. 253, 261-262 (2014)
30 Another enduring difficulty in examining the Court’s view of the press is the problem of
determining who (or what) is (or isn’t) the “press” for legal purposes. Scholars have
debated what definition of the “press” the Court has or should embrace. Should we think
of the “press” of the First Amendment as a technology, an institution, or as a profession?
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a
22
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issues of press freedom in indirect ways, scholars are unable to accurately
follow the ebb and flow of the Justices’ views simply by counting the news
media’s track record of wins and losses before the Court.31 At the same
time, doctrinal reviews of the Court’s First Amendment docket are similarly
lacking, because the Justices often reveal their views on the value of the
press in cases that do not directly involve the news media or expressive
freedoms. Past investigations into the Court’s attitudes about the press,
therefore, have been incomplete. While some scholars might have read the
“jurisprudential tea leaves”32 and spotted broad trends in the Court’s
characterizations of the press, these doctrinal examinations were inherently
limited in scope.
Our study, therefore, set out to fill this gap by undertaking a systematic
analysis of the Court’s views of the press and the press function over time
through a large-scale empirical examination. At this critical moment for
press freedom, only a study of this scope and scale can adequately assess
the judicial temperament toward the press and provide a thoughtful starting
point for comparing the judiciary’s changing view of the press to similar
observable trends in the executive and legislative branches.

III. METHODOLOGY
We performed a systematic content analysis of all press mentions
authored by U.S. Supreme Court Justices and published in the U.S.
Reports from 1784 through the completion of October Term 2019 in July
2020.33 The studied text set includes all majority, dissenting, and
Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012); Sonja R. West,
The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49 (2016); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing
Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029 (2015). Is being a member of the press properly
determined by who you are or by what you do? See Randall P. Bezanson, Whither
Freedom of the Press?, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1259 (2012); Michael W. McConnell,
Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412 (2013); Sonja
R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2014). How does this definition
change (or not change) as the methods of communication among members of the public or
between the government and the people evolve? See Patrick J. Charles & Kevin Francis
O'Neill, Saving the Press Clause from Ruin: The Customary Origins of a "Free Press" as
Interface to the Present and Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1691 (2012). As discussed in
more detail in Part III, this study’s methodology was designed to capture the performance
of the press function no matter who was performing it, by capturing acts of “journalism,”
“news,” and “reporting” as identified by the Court itself. In recent cases, this included acts
of so-called “citizen journalism,” performed using new media technologies and not by
traditional legacy media organizations.
31 Cf. Lee Epstein, et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1431 (2013) (analyzing how “pro-business” the Supreme Court has been over time by
tracking whether the Justices ruled for or against a business litigant.)
32 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819 (2012)
33 The first such reference does not occur until 1821.
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concurring opinions as well as all other published writings by individual
Justices, including dissents from denial of certiorari and statements
associated with recusal decisions and stay applications.
The goal was to capture all references to the press in its journalistic
role, to the performance of commonly understood press functions, or to
the right of press freedom—no matter how they were referenced. Because
the press and those performing the press function are referred to by a
variety of names, we conducted initial research of opinions across time to
learn the terms and phrases most often used as synonyms for the press or
primary press behaviors. In some older cases, these included terms that
were unique to particular eras and have since fallen out of use, such as
“newspaperman.”34 In more recent years, with a changing and sometimes
more decentralized media ecosystem, it included terms capturing the
performance of the newsgathering and reporting functions by entities
other than traditional media outlets, such as references to a “citizen
journalist.”35 In all instances, we made these determinations by tracking
the Justices’ own identifications of when they perceived that the press
function was occurring. To capture a database with this scope of pressidentifying language, we then conducted a broadly drawn Westlaw search
for a total of nineteen linguistic terms.36 Opinions that contained only uses
of these terms in a non-journalistic sense37 were removed from the set as
false hits, and we downloaded the remaining text files, parsed using a

34

See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798–99 (1978) (Burger, J.,
concurring); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 311 (1967); In re Sawyer, 360
U.S. 622, 655 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“newspaperman”); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 821 (1974); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 847 (1974); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355
(1966); In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312, 1314 (1980) (“newsman”).
35 See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1740 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(discussing a hypothetical individual recording a police encounter on a cell phone camera
and streaming to social media followers as working as a “citizen journalist”).
36 The specific search syntax was as follows (without the leading and ending quotation
marks): “adv: OPINION(#press or media or newspaper or "fourth estate" or journalis! or
reporter or newspaperman or newsman or pressman or (news /2 (gather! or magazine or
outlet or organization or service or coverage or article or story or cycle or broadcast!)))”.
37 For example, “court reporter,” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 430
(1993), Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228–29 (1971), “reporter of decision,”
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1506 (2020), “press charges,”
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 557 (2007), “dry cleaning press,” Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 161 (1995), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529
U.S. 205, 212 (2000), or “media of expression,” Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 (2017). We also removed as false hits paragraphs that included
the specified terms only in case names or titles of books and other material cited by the
authoring Justice or that made true reference to a press entity as a noun, but in a noncharacterizing way that could be replaced with any other noun.
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basic script written in R, to create packets for coders.38 Coders assessed
whether each individual hit was a real hit and, if so, coded the paragraph.
From this full set, which included more than five thousand presscharacterizing paragraphs, coders systematically coded each reference for
the presence of eight common press-related thematic content frames: the
propriety of regulating the press (the “Regulation Frame”); the press’s
effect on government and democracy (the “Democracy Frame”), the
press’s historical value to the Founders (the “History Frame”), the press’s
use as a public communication mechanism (the “Communication
Frame”), the press’s influence on the judicial system (the “Judicial
System Frame”), the press’s impact on individuals’ reputations and
privacy (the “Individuals Frame”), the constitutional right of press
freedom (the “Right Frame”), and the press’s trustworthiness and ethics
(the “Trustworthiness Frame”). Paragraphs could—and in many instances
did—contain multiple frames.
Each thematic content frame was then coded for affective tone—that
is, whether the individual frame was conveyed with a positive, negative,
or neutral connotation.39 So, for example, if a paragraph made reference to
the press’s trustworthiness, reliability, professionalism, or ethics in any
way, it would be coded as containing the Trustworthiness Frame. If the
reference stated or suggested that the press does behave in a trustworthy
manner, the tone would be coded as positive. If the reference indicated
that the press behaves in an untrustworthy manner, the tone would be
coded as negative.40 If the reference noted the existence of a debate over
the trustworthiness of the press without taking a position, the tone would
be coded as neutral.

38

Paragraphs were randomly shuffled for coder review of every hit, such that paragraphs
from earlier and later periods in the chronological data set were mixed and multiple
paragraphs from a single opinion were not presented seriatim, so as to avoid any possible
acclimation effects that might arise from a coder working within a particular opinion or
time period. We did this to provide some context to the coders working in randomly sorted
coding packets. Each packet included the paragraph containing the search hit and the
paragraph above and below it, for context.
39 Coders worked from a detailed codebook (on file with authors and available upon
request), received 25 hours of substantive training on identification of frame and tone, and
performed nine rounds of beta testing on practice batches of paragraphs. We also
iteratively revised the codebook itself in instances where our initial protocols had been
unclear or yielded coding results that were unreliable across the coders. Intercoder
agreement was +95% on thematic frame content and +90% on affective tone.
40 The coding scheme allowed for each unique paragraph-frame combination to take on
each of the possible tone values. A single paragraph could, for example, be coded with
both a positive Trustworthiness Frame and a negative Trustworthiness Frame, if the
authoring Justice characterized the press both ways within the paragraph.
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Post-coding analysis merged the paragraphs with the Supreme Court
Database, which allowed Justice- and case-level examination of results,41
including analysis of each press reference by Court term, by the Justices
who authored the opinion, and by case topic area.42
Importantly, this approach captured every time the Court engaged in
a characterization of the press, not just those cases in which the press was
a party or press freedom was expressly at issue. The aims were to explore
how the Justices of the Court have depicted the press overall and to
portray the full scope of their depictions over time. Thus, the dataset
includes instances in which the Court is primarily addressing some other
matter—a criminal law or antitrust issue, for example—but takes a
moment in passing to say something about the press or to situate its role in
society for the reader of the judicial opinion. See Figure *1*.
We discovered that these press-characterizing “asides” happen with
some frequency and that they often convey some core assumptions about
the press. Sometimes they are positive—for example, when the Court offhandedly praises an act of newsgathering as socially valuable or casually
mentions freedom of the press as a critically important value when listing
such values in a case focused on another constitutionally protected liberty.
Sometimes they are negative, with the Court, for example, describing the
tendency of news coverage to be sensational or privacy invading.
Sometimes they are neutral, when the Court, for example, merely notes
the existence of the press function of distributing information to the public
by stating in the facts of an opinion that a newspaper story existed. This
study codes both doctrinal and nondoctrinal depictions of the press, and in
so doing, captures the full picture of the whole universe of press
characterizations over the course of the Supreme Court’s entire history.

41

See The Supreme Court Database, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ (noting that the database
“contains over two hundred pieces of information about each case decided by the Court
between the 1791 and 2019 terms,” including “the identity of the court whose decision the
Supreme Court reviewed, the parties to the suit, the legal provisions considered in the case,
and the votes of the Justices”).
42 In a small number of cases, non-opinion materials included within the studied set—for
example, dissents from denial of certiorari or published statements on recusal—were not
found within the Supreme Court Database. In these instances, the relevant information,
such as authoring Justice, Term of publication, and the Supreme Court issue area as
defined by the detailed Supreme Court Database Codebook, were added manually to the
data set. See Supreme Court Database Online Codebook,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?s=1.
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The data summarized below includes 5,250 coder-reviewed
paragraphs from 1,296 unique cases, containing 8,792 total
characterizations43 of the press. See Figure 2.

IV. A WANING PERCEPTION OF THE FREE PRESS
The most notable trend across all categories of gathered data in this
study is that the U.S. Supreme Court’s characterizations of the press are
starkly declining in both quantity and quality. The Court makes far fewer
references to the press and its role in society than it once did. When the
Court does talk about the press, moreover, it is doing so in increasingly
negative ways.

A. Decreased References to the Press and Press Freedom
Through an investigation of the frequency of press references, we find
that the Court is acknowledging both the existence of journalism in
American society and the bare notion of a “freedom of the press” much less
often than it did a half century ago. Today’s Court, in other words, is far
less likely to talk about the press or press freedom in any role.
Figures 3 and *4* show the overall frequency of coded mentions
across time. Since the late 1970s, the incidence of press references has
steeply declined. The number of cases that the Court has heard per term has
decreased during this same time period, 44 which may account for some of
this decline. However, because the unit of analysis for this study is the
paragraph, the impact of fewer cases per term is significantly tempered by
stark increases in overall opinion length and a clear uptick in the practice
of individual Justices of the Court writing more separate opinions per
case.45 Frequency comparisons might also be impacted by the fact that the
43

Each frame-tone combination is treated as an individual mention. If a paragraph
contained multiple frames—or multiple tonal depictions of a single frame—all were coded
individually.
44 Federal Judicial Caseloads, 1789-2016, FED. JUD. CTR. (last visited Sept. 3, 2020),
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/supreme-court-caseloads-18802015 (showing Supreme Court petitions granted peaking in 1981 and steadily declining
since.); Supreme Court Cases, October Term 2019-2020, BALLOTPEDIA (last visited Sept.
3, 2020), https://ballotpedia.org/Supreme_Court_cases,_October_term_2019-2020 (“The
court issued decisions in 63 cases this [2019-2020] term. Between the 2007 and 2019
terms, SCOTUS released opinions in 991 cases, averaging 76 cases per year”).
45 See Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES,
(Nov. 17, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html#:~:text=The%20lengths%20of%20decisions%2C%20including,a%20record%2C%20at%208%2C265%20words (noting that that between 2007 and 2019, there
was “at least one concurring opinion in 77 percent of unanimous rulings” and that, while
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 had 4,000 words, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission in 2010 had 48,000, “the length of the Great Gatsby”).
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Court unquestionably agreed to hear many more cases in the 1960s and 70s
that were specifically focused on the press or press rights.46 Although all
these changes do make contrasts between the low-frequency current Court
and the high-frequency era of the Court a half-century ago more
complicated, they are all trends that illustrate rather than undermine the
theme identified here: that the Court has largely lost interest in speaking
about the press.
This trend holds true for every studied frame. So, for example, as seen
in Figure 8, the Court’s references characterizing the press within the
Regulation Frame, which captures the Justices’ views on the news media’s
power and the appropriateness of government regulation of the press, peak
in the 1970s and drop off precipitously after that, diminishing to close to
zero in recent years.47 Characterizations of the press’s effect on democratic
government, its influence on the judicial system, its impact on individuals’
reputations and privacy, its trustworthiness and ethics, and its value to the
founders all similarly plummeted. See Figure 9 (Democracy Frame); Figure
10 (Judicial System Frame); Figure 11 (Individuals Frame); Figure 12
(Trustworthiness Frame); Figure 13 (History Frame). Indeed, it appears that
the U.S. Supreme Court has in effect stopped making even the most casual
of references to the press and its operation in society. The Communications
Frame captured all textual references in which the Court merely
acknowledged or implied that journalism is the means by which
information is made widely known and bare mentions of the gathering,
reporting, and editing of news. As shown in Figure 14, even these most
basic of nods to the press function have ebbed in recent years.48 In other
words, as a practical matter, the Court today is erasing the work of the press
from its public discourse.
The “freedom of the press,” moreover, has also dropped out of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s collective vocabulary. See Figure 15. The data show
that a generation ago the Court routinely acknowledged press freedom as a
First Amendment right worthy of mention, yet today it does not. The Right
Frame, which was coded every time the Court made any reference to rights46

This can be seen in several aspects of our data, including Figures 5 and 6, showing the
number and frequency of press-characterizing paragraphs found within cases coded with
the Supreme Court Database’s First Amendment category, and Figure 7, showing many
more press-characterizing paragraphs per opinion in the 1970s, which might be expected
of cases squarely dealing with press-related issues. (In 1975-79, there were cases with 45
or more press-characterizing paragraphs in a single opinion. Since 2015, no case has had
more than 10).
47 At the Regulation Frame’s peak in 1973, there were 156 characterizations of it in a
single term. The combined total references to the frame in the most recent five terms are
just 24.
48 At its height, the Court was using this frame 60 times in a single term (1971)—twice as
many times as it has invoked the frame in the most recent five terms combined.
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recognizing language like “freedom of the press,” “the liberty of the press,”
or “the right of a free press,” hit its crest in the 1970s and has declined so
thoroughly that many recent terms make no reference to it at all.49 This
decline appears not to be exclusively or even primarily due to a reduced
caseload of press-focused cases. Many of the references at the height of the
Court’s usage of this frame came by way of inclusion of “freedom of the
press” in something of a laundry list of important values not at issue in the
particular case50 or in the Court’s inclusive use of the First Amendment
language “freedom of speech or of the press” in cases that were focused on
speech rights.51 That practice has ended, and the Court now eschews
reference to the press component of the right. Rhetorically, the freedom of
the press as a specified, recognizable liberty has all but disappeared.
A radically declining incidence of Supreme Court attention to the
press—like most issues related to the press in American society today—is
a “wicked problem,”52 in which both the scope of causation and the array
of practical ramifications are complicated by the existence of other
simultaneously occurring phenomena. This changing behavior by the Court
is, of course, happening alongside a changing media landscape, a changing
public, a changing economy, and a changing political environment. The
Court’s choice to shy away from its once-frequent pattern of judicial
characterization of the press surely cannot be divorced from other factors,
including the evolving mass communication technology or the strategic
decisions made by the news media to avoid bringing cases to the Court
because of limited finances53 or limited confidence in positive outcomes.54
The confluence of factors may prove complicated to unpack. But the
49

For further investigation of this data and its theoretical and practical ramifications, see
RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Disappearing Freedom of the Press,
(forthcoming).
50 W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (noting, in an
expressive freedom case, the right to “a free press”); Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of
Colored People v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (describing, in a
freedom of association case, the “indispensable liberties . . . of speech, press, or
association”). Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492 (1961) (suggesting, in a religious
freedom case, that the First Amendment “broke new constitutional ground in the
protection it sought to afford to freedom of religion, speech, press, petition
and assembly”).
51 De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga.,
303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U.S.
147, 160 (1939); Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
52
Martha Minow, SAVING THE NEWS: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR GOVERNMENT
ACTION TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2020).
53 See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 617-19 (2011)
(addressing the financial decline of the newspaper industry and its impact on constitutional
litigation).
54 We note, however, that the data shows a decline in press references across the board and
not just a decline in cases in which the press is a party.
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Court’s choices unquestionably matter. The U.S. Supreme Court has a
heavy influence in shaping the environment for the exercise of rights and
has historically been a source of significant public narrative about the role
the press plays in society. That it has fallen silent on this front—and that it
has virtually ceased to give voice to even the bare existence of an American
freedom of the press—is an important component of the wider conversation
on the future of the media.

B. A Sharp Decline in Tone
Notably, a parallel and concerning trend demonstrates an
unambiguous decline in the tone the U.S. Supreme Court uses to
characterize the press. Not only is the Court talking about the press much
less often than it once did, when it does talk about the press, it is now more
likely to do so in a negative, rather than a positive, manner.
In the last 50 years, the Court’s view of the news media has been
deteriorating across a variety of measures. Overall tone data, depicted in
Figures 16 and 17, shows positivity of press characterization peaking
sharply in the 1970s and declining in the years since. Indeed, a Supreme
Court reference to the press a generation ago was more than twice as likely
to be characterized positively as a reference from today’s Court.55
This remarkable shift is sharply illustrated through a comparison of
two 15-year periods: the first from the Court’s 1970 term to its 1984 term
and the second from the 2005 term to the 2019 term. See Figure 18. During
the 1970-1984 period, there were more positive than negative mentions in
twelve of the fifteen years. As for the other three terms, one was split evenly
between positives and negatives (1978) and another had only three more
negative references than positive (1980). Only a single term, 1981,
provided even modest evidence of an anti-press slant, where 29 percent of
the 129 mentions were negative as compared to 18 percent of mentions that
were positive (i.e., the majority of references were neutral). In ten of the
fifteen terms, 30 percent or more of the mentions were positive. In three of
the terms, positive mentions exceeded 40 percent and in one term, they
neared half of all mentions.56 Meanwhile, negative mentions in that time
period never once reached 30 percent of the total, and in several terms, the
percentage of mentions that were negative was in the teens.57 Notably, this
low negativity took place against the backdrop of a staggeringly large
55

The average proportion of positive references in the 1970-1984 terms was 33 percent.
The average proportion of positive references in the 2005-2019 terms was 16 percent.
56 October Term 1972 had 47 percent positive mentions.
57 October Terms 1972 (19 percent negative mentions); 1976 (19 percent negative
mentions); 1979 (11 percent negative mentions); 1983 (15 percent negative mentions).
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number of total paragraphs referencing the press; the seven terms with the
highest frequency of press mentions in all of history are within this
timeframe.
Conversely, in the most recent 15-year period, the Court’s presspositivity rate has plummeted to an average of just 16 percent per term. In
no term has it ever reached 30 percent of the total references, and in eight
of the fifteen years, it has been 15 percent or lower. In three terms—2012,
2015, and 2017—no Justice of the Court made any positive characterization
at all in any majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion or other official
writing published in the U.S. Reports. In sharp contrast to a generation ago,
in ten of the fifteen most recent terms, the number of negative mentions
was equal to or greater than the number of positive mentions. In 2015, for
the first time in history, the number of negative press mentions
outnumbered the combined total of positive and neutral references, with 75
percent of references conveying negativity.
Our data tracking neutrality also reveals a noteworthy shift in tone. In
the earlier of the two 15-year blocks, neutral references averaged 46 percent
of the total. In three of the fifteen years, positive references equaled or
outnumbered neutral references. In the most recent 15-year block, however,
the average neutrality rate is close to two-thirds. Except for one outlier year,
in which the positive and neutral numbers were identical, neutrality now
always exceeds positivity, and often by large margins. The gravitational
pull, therefore, seems to be appearing on two fronts—from positive to
neutral and from neutral to negative.58
Ultimately, the tone-trend analyses in the study run entirely in the
direction of reduced positivity toward the press and the press function. The
modern data suggest that the current Court will engage in any positive
characterization of the press only in the rarest of situations.
When tonal data is investigated against the backdrop of specific
frames, powerful subtrends emerge—all of which also point in the direction
of a U.S. Supreme Court with a decreased respect for and a devalued
characterization of the press. This is true in at least three ways.
First, frames that tend to produce positive characterizations from the
Court are on the decline. The data indicate that some frames are
overwhelmingly predictive of a positive tone. So, for example, the
Democracy Frame captures every instance in which the Court speaks of the
press having an impact on government or another powerful entity or having
an impact more generally on democracy, elections, or the functioning of
representative government. When the Court chooses to use this frame, it
58

These trends are in line with our analysis of the effect of ideology over time, which we
discuss further below. See, infra, Part V.B.
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almost always does so positively—characterizing the press as serving as a
“check”59 or “watchdog”60 that creates accountability and that subjects
powerful actors or their policies to public scrutiny in ways that are valuable
and beneficial to society. Included within this frame are the many
references to the press and its work being “central to a free society,”61
aiding voters’ decision-making,62 or bringing to light matters of public
concern. As seen in Figures *19* and *20*, this positive tone predominates
within the frame, while negative and neutral uses of it are much rarer. But
the frequency data depicts how this thoroughly this positive frame has
fallen out of use. We see this frame building in occurrence, peaking during
the mid-1960s to the early 1980s—an era that maps onto Watergate, the
Pentagon Papers, and a swelling public sense of the heroism of
journalism63—and then dropping off significantly during the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts. The Court is simply not discussing the press through the
lens of its democracy- and accountability-enhancement functions anymore.
The once relatively frequent pattern of including a paragraph or sentence
with this complementary characterization of the press as an accountabilityenhancing watchdog is largely a thing of the past.
A similar trend is visible in the History Frame, which was coded any
time a Justice of the Court mentioned the founders, the founding era, or the
59

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-28 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the press acts as a vital check which “serves the basic purpose
of the First Amendment”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 569, 580
(1980) (holding that the First Amendment guarantees the right of the public and press to
attend criminal trials as a check on the government).
60 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 440 (1991) (explaining that taxes should not hinder
the press’ important role as “a watchdog of government activity”).
61 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 407–08 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that truth and publication is “central to a free society”).
62 Mills v. Ala., 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966) (explaining the First Amendment’s purpose
is to “protect the free discussion of governmental affairs” including “discussions of
candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is
operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes” to
create an informed citizenry).
63 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (“In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other
areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in
the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry—
in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of
democratic government. For this reason, it is perhaps here that a press that is alert, aware,
and free most vitally serves the basic purpose of the First Amendment. For without an
informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people”); Stephen F.
Rohde, Presidential Power Free Press "We Consider This Case Against the Background
of A Profound National Commitment to the Principle That Debate on Public Issues ... May
Well Include Vehement, Caustic, and Sometimes Unpleasant, L.A. LAW., Oct. 2017, at 26,
30-31; Paul Brewer, The Fourth Estate and the Quest for A Double Edged Shield: Why A
Federal Reporters' Shield Law Would Violate the First Amendment, 36 U. MEM. L. REV.
1073, 1114 (2006) (stating the declining public view of the press since Watergate).
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original intent of the First Amendment as it pertains to the press. 64
Although the overall number of total uses is relatively small, compared to
some other frames, positive historical connotations—suggesting that, as an
originalist matter, the founders valued, prioritized, or crafted constitutional
provisions with an aim of protecting the press65—overwhelmingly
outnumber negative and neutral references. See Figures *21* and *22*.
Again, this frame builds in frequency, peaks in the 1970s, and then drops
off, so much so that it is virtually undetectable in many of the most recent
years of the Roberts Court.66 Staggeringly, in the one recent term in which
it does appear, our data show it flipping to total negativity of tone. All told,
it appears that the current Court is outright abandoning framings of the
press that—either as a practical matter or as a matter of established
precedent or rhetorical pattern—are positive in their depictions. If a
particular framing of the press is primarily positive, the Court now chooses
not use it.
Second, and conversely, frames that are predictors of the Court’s
negativity toward the press now have more frequency, as a percentage of
mentions, and even stronger intra-frame negativity. Most notably, the
Individuals Frame encompasses references by the Court to the press’s
impact on individual people’s privacy interests, reputational interests, or
64

For further discussion of this data, which contrasts with the increased use of originalism
as a jurisprudential tool in other First Amendment contexts and in the wider body of
constitutional law, see RonNell Andersen Jones and Sonja R. West, The Supreme Court,
The Founders, and The Free Press (forthcoming).
65 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715-17 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“Madison and the other Framers of the First Amendment, able men that they
were, wrote in language they earnestly believed could never be misunderstood: ‘Congress
shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom * * * of the press * * *.’ Both the history
and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to
publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints. . .
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must
have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. . . Only a free and unrestrained press can
effectively expose deception in government”); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 151–55 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The sturdy people
who fashioned the First Amendment would be shocked at that intrusion of Government
into a field which in this Nation has been reserved for individuals, whatever part of the
spectrum of opinion they represent . . . But even Thomas Jefferson, who knew how base
and obnoxious the press could be, never dreamed of interfering. For he thought that
government control of newspapers would be the greater of two evils”); Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful
antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen
means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom they
were selected to serve. Suppression of the right of the press to praise or criticize
governmental agents and to clamor and contend for or against change, which is all that this
editorial did, muzzles one of the very agencies the Framers of our Constitution
thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it free”).
66 From 2008-2019 there were just seven such references—three in October Term 2009
and four in October Term 2018. From October Term 2004 to 2008, there were none at all.
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emotional interests. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the existence of legal
causes of action for invasion of privacy, defamation and infliction of
emotional distress, the negative tone appears much more often in this frame
than do the neutral or positive tones. See Figures *23* and *24*. When the
Individuals Frame is invoked, it is usually for the Court to comment that
the press injured (or was a tool used by someone else to injure) an
individual’s privacy, reputation, or emotional well-being. The combined
tone and frequency data show upward negative tone trends and
comparatively stronger frequency over the last half-century.67 At the peak
of the Court’s generous treatment of the press, in the 1970s, the negative
Individuals Frame references were tempered somewhat by neutral ones.
Today, that is not the case. In many recent years, the entire set of
Individuals Frame characterizations is tonally negative.68 Put another way,
although the Roberts Court is a Court that is not talking about the press all
that often, when it does so, it is saying that the press is harmful to people.
Finally, the tone trend is also seen in data gathered on what we might
term “mixed-tone” frames—content characterizations of the press that the
Court has sometimes portrayed in a positive way and sometimes in a
negative one. The Trustworthiness Frame and the Regulation Frame both
demonstrate this phenomenon. As seen in Figure *25*, the Trustworthiness
Frame skews negative overall, but has a mixed-tone history with a distinct
upward trajectory of negativity. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Court’s
references to media trustworthiness and ethics were much more tonally
varied—with many cases describing the press as a trusted, useful, ethical
institution and indicating that journalism is a source of accurate, dependable
information from credible sources. The more recent cases, from the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, chart very little positivity in this frame, with
the most recent studied years charting none at all. 69 See also Figure *26*.
Indeed, there has not been a positive reference to the trustworthiness of the
67

Ninety-two percent of the Individuals Frame references from 2010 to 2019 were
negative; none were positive. While the Individuals Frame accounts for just 2.9 percent of
references in the total data set, it accounts for seven percent of frequency in the 2015 to
2019 Terms. With a large percentage of the current Justices’ references falling into the
neutral Communications Frame—simply noting the existence of the press as an entity that
published material for the public—even small increases in the remaining substantive
frames take on meaningful impact on the remaining spread of actual characterizations of
the press.
68
The 2018, 2015, and 2010 Terms all had Individuals Frame references with only a
negative tone. Between 2010 and 2019, the total tone spread was 92 percent negative and 8
percent neutral.
69 For more in-depth analysis of trends related to the Court’s characterization of the
trustworthiness, accuracy, and ethics of the press, including comparisons between the
Court’s views on these matters and those of the public at large, see RonNell Andersen
Jones & Sonja R. West, The Supreme Court and Public Perceptions of Press
Trustworthiness (forthcoming).
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press from any Justice since 2009.70 Thus, when the Court is taking the
opportunity to opine on the subject, the opinion it is projecting is now more
often that the press lacks credibility and is unethical, dishonest, and
inaccurate.
Similarly, but to a lesser extent, the Regulation Frame also shows
some increased negativity in a mixed-tone dynamic. This frame follows the
Court’s acceptance or rejection of the government’s ability to regulate the
press. Although positive tones have traditionally outpaced negatives, this
frame has always been somewhat tonally mixed; the Court, even in its most
positive historical years, has recognized a substantial number of situations
in which the press could or should be regulated. As depicted in Figures 27
and 28, there is also a slight increase in negativity within this frame over
time.71
All told, on every meaningful measure included within the study—
including the frequency of acknowledgement of the press, the frames
selected for characterizing the press, and the tone used to depict the press—
the current Court is significantly less positive than the Court a generation
ago. The data suggest the press is unlikely to find a receptive audience at
the U.S. Supreme Court anytime soon.72

V. IDEOLOGY AND CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PRESS
Mapping our data onto the information available in the Supreme Court
Database provides further insights by allowing us to examine the
relationship between the Justices’ political ideologies and their attitudes
toward the press. Our analysis reveals that judicial ideology is highly
correlated with a Justice’s likelihood of adopting either a positive or
negative tone when characterizing the press. It also suggests that the current
70

A generation ago, the percentage of neutral references in this category was also larger. It
thus appears that the Court is shifting negatively, with references that would once have
been made in a neutral way now being made with a negative connotation.
71 Negativity of Regulation Frame references increased from 26 percent in 1960 to 33
percent in 2019.
72 As with the frequency data, the tone data situates itself within a wider, multifaceted
societal and media dynamic. We do not suggest that the Court’s perceptions of the press
are the sole factor in any meaningful consideration of press roles or press rights. But,
particularly given the comparatively intense scrutiny given to changing press
characterizations within the elected branches, there is compelling reason to interrogate the
false assumptions that might have been made about a baseline of positivity from the Court
and to explore what the data to the contrary may mean for the already complicated
conversations about the press’s composition, its performance, and its protection in
American society. For our closer investigation of the interrelationship between declining
public trust of the media and declining Court characterizations of the press’s
trustworthiness, see RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Supreme Court and
Public Perceptions of Press Trustworthiness (forthcoming).
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Court has entered an overall press-unfriendly period in which even those
Justices whose ideology might have predicted press friendliness a
generation ago will be less likely to be positive about the press today.

A. Strong Relationship Between Judicial Ideology and Tone
To assess the connection between judicial ideology and tone, we
compared the probability of a positive, neutral or negative reference to the
press with each Justice’s “Martin-Quinn” score, a widely used model that
places U.S. Supreme Court Justices on a liberal-conservative ideological
spectrum.73 A Justice who falls on the more conservative side of the
ideological continuum receives a higher Martin-Quinn score, while moreliberal Justices are given lower scores.
When applied to our data,74 we find statistically and substantively
meaningful relationships between judicial ideology and all three tones.
More specifically, we find that liberal Justices are more likely than
conservative Justices to write positively about the press, while conservative
Justices are more likely than their liberal colleagues to adopt a negative
tone. The effect is heightened, moreover, the higher (or lower) we move
along the ideological scale. At the far ends of the spectrum, we find that the
most liberal Justices are also the most press friendly, whereas the most
conservative Justices express the least favorable views toward the press. As
for neutral depictions, the relationship is less dramatic but behaves
generally like negative characterizations, with conservative Justices being
somewhat more likely to adopt neutral tones than liberal Justices.
Figure *29* shows the relationship between the likelihood of
depiction for all three tones (y-axis) and the opinion writer’s Martin-Quinn
score (x-axis). The most liberal Justices appear on the far left of the scale
and the most conservative appear on the far right. Starting with the most

73

See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134
(2002). For updated information, see https://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu. For a discussion
describing the Martin-Quinn method in “non-technical fashion that is likely to be
understood by a legal audience,” see Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of MartinQuinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, with Special Attention to the Problem of
Ideological Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 143-147 (2007).
74 These estimates come from a series of logistic regression models that we estimated from
our underlying treatment data. For example, to generate the positive predicted probabilities
we regressed whether a reference was positive (1 = yes, 0 = no) on a Justice’s MartinQuinn score and the squared value of a Justice’s Martin-Quinn score. We include the
square to allow for the possibility of a non-linear effect (e.g., the possibility that positive
treatment happens for both very liberal and very conservative Justices).
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liberal Justices,75 we see that they are much more likely to communicate a
positive sentiment (i.e., the square points) about the news media than a
negative one (i.e., the triangle points). These Justices, in fact, are more than
five times as likely to make positive references to the press, which they do
with a 52 percent likelihood, than negative ones, which occurs only 11
percent of the time. Consider, by contrast, a Justice with more moderate
judicial preferences. A Justice falling near zero76 on the Martin-Quinn scale
would have an estimated 31 percent chance of making a positive reference
and a 22 percent probability of making a negative one.
The most conservative Justices,77 by contrast, are more likely than any
other Justices to speak negatively about the press and the least likely to
speak positively. We estimate that the most conservative Justices have a 29
percent chance of making a negative reference and just a 22 percent chance
of making a positive one. When discussing the press, however, these
Justices are most likely to adopt a neutral tone (i.e., the diamond points)
which they employed 48 percent of the time, than either a negative or
positive one. This is similar to the Justices in the middle of the ideological
scale, who remain neutral 45 percent of the time. Yet the most conservative
Justices diverge significantly from the median Justices in that they are 10
percentage points more likely to make negative remarks and 13 percentage
points less likely to be press-positive than their colleagues in the center.
Thus the differences between how the most liberal and the most
conservative Justices talk about the press are striking. Justices on the most
liberal end of the Martin-Quinn scale are more than twice as likely as the
most conservative Justices to mention the press in a positive manner. The
correlation is reversed when considering negative references; a Justice on
the conservative end of the spectrum is two and a half times more likely to
characterize the press negatively than the most liberal Justices.
While judicial ideology has a clear impact on the tone of press
mentions, our data show that this effect is not equal among frames. Figure
30 depicts the intersection of ideology, frame and tone.78 This chart (as well
as others that are discussed below) plots the effect on the probability that a
Justice will adopt a particular tone when the Martin-Quinn score is shifted
one unit (or one point) toward the more conservative end of the scale. To
This corresponds to Justice William O. Douglas’ during the latter part of his tenure on
the Court, when he had Martin-Quinn scores of less than -7 from the 1965 Term through
the 1975 Term.
76 This corresponds (approximately) to Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who had a MartinQuinn score of -0.04 during the 2016 Term.
77 Substantively, then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist from 1975-1979, when he
had a Martin-Quinn score of around 4.5.
78 This Figure also groups the frames as “Mostly Positive Treatments,” “Mostly Neutral
Treatments,” and “Mostly Negative Treatments.”
75
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put this in perspective, a one-unit difference is approximately equivalent to
the difference during the Court’s 2007 term between Chief Justice John
Roberts (1.42) and Justice Anthony Kennedy (0.41) or, also during the 2007
term, between Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia (2.46).79 This figure also
includes vertical “whisker” lines designating the confidence intervals.
When the whisker lines do not cross the dashed zero line, it indicates that
the effect of the ideological shift is significant. While we present our data
in terms of smaller, one-unit ideological shifts, it is important to keep in
mind that the practical implications between liberal and conservative
Justices are often much larger because the Justices are frequently divided
by significantly more than a single Martin-Quinn unit. During 2019 term,
for example, Justice Elena Kagan and Chief Justice John Roberts were the
liberal and conservative Justices who fell closest on the ideological scale—
yet even they were separated by a distance of almost two units. The most
extreme ideological gap in 2019 was between Justice Sonia Sotomayor and
Justice Clarence Thomas, who were more than 7 units apart. A seemingly
small variance in the ideological effect in our data (for example, a 3 or 4
percentage point gap) would therefore represent a much larger real-world
effect between these two Justices (in our example, a roughly 21 to 28
percentage point difference).
As seen in Figure 30, judicial ideology has the strongest effect in the
Regulation Frame, which tracked the Justices’ attitudes toward the
importance of the press and, in particular, the acceptability of government
regulation of the press. For each additional point we move toward the more
conservative end of the Martin-Quinn scale, a Justice’s likelihood of
positively discussing the importance of the press decreased by 4 percent
and her likelihood of negatively characterizing the press increases by 3.5
percent.80 The impact of ideology on the tone used in other frames,
however, is often minimal. Even though Trustworthiness is a generally
negative frame, for example, the influence of a Justice’s ideology on tone
is statistically insignificant, suggesting that liberal and conservative
Justices are generally equally likely to cast doubt, at times, on the press’s
reliability, professionalism or ethics.
One place where Justices on the extreme ideological ends of the scale
tend to align—and differ from their colleagues in the middle—is in the
frequency with which they mention the press. Figure 31 shows that as we
move from the most liberal Justices toward the ideological center, there is
Comparisons from the liberal side of the Court are possible, too. During the Court’s
2013 Term, for example, Justice Elena Kagan had an estimated score of -1.62 compared to
an estimate of -2.58 for Justice Sonia Sotomayor.
80 For a discussion of the Court’s view on the Regulation of the press over time, see
RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The U.S. Supreme Court and Press Regulation
(forthcoming).
79
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an initial decrease in the total number of references. But when we continue
to move toward the most conservative Justices, the frequency with which
they discuss the press increases again.81 These numbers suggest that, when
compared to their colleagues in the middle, the most liberal and most
conservative Justices are somewhat more likely to find opportunities to
discuss the press. Taken in conjunction with the tone-trend data, it seems
that the most conservative Justices are more prone to going out of their way
to offer up negative characterizations of the press and that the most liberal
Justices are finding opportunities to present positive ones.

B. Impact of Ideology Over Time
We also investigated the impact of judicial ideology on the tone of
press characterizations over time. We are able to track this relationship
beginning in 1937, the earliest year for which Martin-Quinn scores are
available. The relationships between ideology and tone that are revealed
through this analysis are complex, but they provide important insights into
our understanding of exactly how today’s less press-friendly Court has,
over time, been displacing the press-friendly Court of a generation ago.
Indeed, the data seem to reveal a gravitational pull toward press
unfriendliness that keeps even the Court’s most liberal Justices—who a half
century ago might have gone out of their way to praise the press or the press
function—from positively characterizing them today.
Three interrelated trends appear to speak to this story. The first is the
recent uptick in the impact that conservative ideology is having on the
likelihood of negative press characterizations. As seen in Figure 32, the
effect of ideology on negative mentions has varied widely over the years.
In the Court’s earlier terms, conservative shifts in ideology were
significantly correlated to increases in the probability of negative reference
to the press. In 1937, for example, a more conservative Justice was 6
percent more likely to discuss the press negatively than a more liberal
Justice who sat one Martin-Quinn unit to his left. Over time, this effect
softened, and by 1986, the impact of ideology on negative tone had
decreased to making less than a 1 percent difference. Notably, however, the
last several decades have shown signs that the gap is widening once again.
It is now three times what it was in the 1980s. In the 2019 term, a one-unit
increase in a Justice’s Martin-Quinn conservatism corresponded to
approximately a 3 percent increase in the chance of a negative press

81

Stated a bit more formally, the marginal effect of a one-unit increase in ideology on the
number of paragraphs is negative and statistically significant when ideology runs from -5
through about -1. It is null (p > 0.20) for -1 through +3.5 and then positive and statistically
significant from +3.5 to +4.5 (p < 0.10, one-tailed test).
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reference. That is, the relationship between ideology and press negativity is
again becoming stronger.
The correlation our data show between the conservative ideology of
more recent Justices and their negative attitudes toward the news media
mirrors the partisan divide that we see today among members of the public
and representatives of the political branches. A 2020 poll by Gallup and the
Knight Foundation, for example, found that “Republicans express more
negative sentiments on every aspect of media performance compared to
Democrats and independents.”82 Our data dispel any suggestion that the
Justices are unaffected by these political influences. This conclusion is
supported by research establishing that political influences on the Court are
increasing. As two Court scholars observed, today’s Justices are sharply
split along partisan lines in a manner that is “unprecedented”83 and “unique
in the Court’s history.”84
This is all occurring, meanwhile, against the backdrop of a Court that
has been steadily trending to the right over the past several decades.85
Indeed, as of 2010, when Justice Elena Kagan joined the Court following
the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens, the partisan transformation had
become complete in that every sitting Republican-nominated Justice was
ideologically to the right of all of the Democratic-nominated Justices.86 Our
82

GALLUP & KNIGHT FOUNDATION, AMERICAN VIEWS 2020: TRUST, MEDIA AND
DEMOCRACY (2020), https://knightfoundation.org/reports/american-views-2020-trustmedia-and-democracy/ (The poll found that 72 percent of Republicans said they believe
there is “a great deal” of political bias in news coverage, compared to only 28 percent of
Democrats. Democrats, meanwhile, are more likely than Republicans to say that the press
plays a “very important” or “critical” role in our democracy. When asked how much blame
the press deserves for America’s political divisions, 75 percent of Republicans (but only
26 percent of Democrats) said “a great deal.”).
83 Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301
84 Id.
85 See Michael A. Bailey, Is Today’s Court the Most Conservative in Sixty Years?
Challenges and Opportunities in Measuring Judicial Preferences, 75 The Journal of
Politics 821, 829 (2013) (stating that the Martin and Quinn scores “indicate that the
contemporary Court is more conservative than any other time since 1937.”); Adam Liptak,
Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. Times (July 24, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html (“[S]cholars who look at overall
trends rather than individual decisions say that widely accepted political science data tell
an unmistakable story about a notably conservative court.”).
86
See Devins & Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the Supreme
Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 301. This is a pattern that has continued
since the Devins and Baum article was published, with Justice Neil Gorsuch replacing
Justice Antonin Scalia in 2017 and Justice Brett Kavanaugh replacing Justice Anthony
Kennedy in 2018. See Ryan Black and Ryan Owens, Neil Gorsuch Could Be the Most
Conservative Justice on the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, March 20, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/15/neil-gorsuch-couldbe-the-most-conservative-justice-on-the-supreme-court/; Robert Barnes and Ann E.
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data suggest that if this trend holds, the forecast for press treatment at the
U.S. Supreme Court may be dire, as the Court is poised to continue its
rightward shift and take an historic ideological turn for the conservative.87
A second trend potentially compounds the real-world impact of the
first. The correlation that once existed between ideology and positive
references to the press—which a generation ago resulted in significant
numbers of press-praising characterizations from the Court’s liberal
Justices—has now essentially disappeared. Figure *33* depicts these
positivity-and-ideology correlations over time, showing that judicial
ideology was a much bigger driver of positive references in the Court’s
earlier terms. In 1937, for example, a one-unit shift toward liberalism raised
the probability of a positive characterization by 5 percent (or, stated in the
converse, an increase in conservatism decreased the probability of a
positive characterization to that same degree).
As seen in the Figure 33, however, the effect of ideology on press
positivity steadily narrows until it becomes statistically insignificant around
2003. This attenuating trend continues until, by the late 2010s, ideology
exerts essentially no effect on the likelihood that a Justice will speak
positively about the press. As discussed in detail above, overtly positive
characterizations of the press or the press function are starkly waning
overall;88 a key point that the ideology data adds to this is the understanding
that a Justice’s increased liberalism is no longer likely to make it more
probable that she will author a positive reference. The press, therefore,
seems to be experiencing the double whammy of compounded negativity
from the ideological group at the Court that has been historically negative
(the conservative Justices) and a loss of positivity from the ideological
group that has been historically positive (the liberal Justices). Ideology is
simply no longer predictive of positive treatment.
The story of the interplay of tone and ideology over time is rounded
out with a third interesting trend on the impact of Justices’ ideology on
neutral mentions. This data provides an even richer account of the shifts
Marimow, On Abortion and Other Issues, Kavanaugh’s Heroes Are More Conservative
Than Kennedy, WASH. POST, July 15, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/on-abortion-and-other-issueskavanaughs-heroes-are-more-conservative-than-kennedy/2018/07/15/04a3975c-86ad11e8-8553-a3ce89036c78_story.html.
87
See Michael A. Bailey, If Trump Appoints a Third Justice, the Supreme Court Would Be
the Most Conservative It’s Been Since 1950, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/22/if-trump-appoints-third-justicesupreme-court-would-be-most-conservative-its-been-since-1950/. In October Term 2019,
Chief Justice John Roberts had a Martin-Quinn score of .216, Justice Brett Kavanaugh had
a score of .513, Justice Neil Gorsuch had a score of .836, Justice Samuel Alito had a score
of 2.051 and Justice Clarence Thomas had a score of 3.691.
88 See supra Part IV.B.
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that have happened since the press-friendly Court a handful of decades
ago and of the ways the press can expect to be treated at the Court in the
years to come. Figure *34* shows that the impact of the Justices’ ideology on neutral mentions has been statistically insignificant for much of
the Court’s history.
But two aspects of this timeline stand out. The first is the reversal in
recent years of the direction of the relationship between ideology and the
likelihood of a neutral characterization. Throughout the last half of the
twentieth century, our data suggest that an increase in conservatism was
associated with a slight increase in the probability of a neutral mention.
By the mid-1990s, however, that effect had not only disappeared but
started to reverse. Increased conservatism became increasingly negative in
nature such that an increase in conservatism was correlated with a
decreased likelihood of a neutral tone. In addition to the direction of the
relationship inverting in recent years, the size of its impact is now greater
than at any other point in our dataset. From the late 1950s to the late
1980s, a one-unit change in ideology translated into only a 1 percent
increase in the chance of a neutral mention. But in our most recent data
for the 2019 term, each one-unit increase in the Martin-Quinn score
decreased the likelihood of a Justice speaking neutrally by almost 3
percent. That is to say that while a generation ago, increased conservatism
made it more likely that a Justice would make a neutral mention, it is now
increased liberalism that makes it more likely that a Justice will speak
with neutrality. When it comes to the impact of ideology on tone, neutral
depictions seem to be moving toward taking the place of positive
depictions (with more liberal Justices moving toward them and more
conservative Justices moving away from them).
One possible explanation for these shifts is that the press-friendly era
at the Court a generation ago created something of a positive gravitational
pull, while the current, press-unfriendly Court is creating an opposite,
negative pull. The overall press-friendly Court may have had an agendasetting effect, as cases were selected for review that had potential pressfriendly outcomes. In the most press-friendly eras, even the most pressnegative ideologues are placed in environments that compel at least a
neutral depiction of the press, and those who might otherwise speak
negatively find themselves sometimes speaking neutrally. In press-negative
eras, in contrast, those whom we might expect, based on ideology, to speak
positively about the press either have fewer opportunities or less inclination
to do so, and so their tone shifts to neutral.
Importantly, while some of the press mentions in this study are either
fact-driven or doctrinal in character (in the sense that they are contained in
paragraphs making objective observations about the behaviors of the press
or reaching tonally substantive holdings about press issues), in many
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instances, neither of these is the case. Justices mentioning the press—just
like the officials in the legislative and executive branches who have
garnered so much recent attention for their press commentary—had a
choice to make about whether to mention the press at all, whether to add a
connotation of praise to that mention, and whether to add an implication of
criticism. The data suggest that current and recent Justices are choosing—
consciously or unconsciously—to make two negative-directional shifts,
one from positivity to neutrality and another from neutrality to negativity.
Some Justices, likely the more conservative, have stronger negative views
of the press, and others, probably the more liberal, may be passing up
potential moments for press positivity in favor of mere neutrality. The
combined result is that positive mentions are only rarely occurring, negative
references are becoming more frequent, and the press is left with fewer
champions at the highest Court in the land.

VI. INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES AND CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PRESS
Finally, we analyzed our data for comparisons between and among
individual Justices, with the goal of identifying the most and least pressfriendly Justices of all time. This individual Justice data also permits us to
summarize both the frequency and the negative-positive characterization
ratios of each of the Justices of the current Court, so as to better understand
the judicial environment the press currently faces.

A. Determining the Justices’ Press-Friendliness
As we have discussed above, there are two primary factors that are
important when thinking about the Court’s characterizations of the press—
frequency and tone.89 The tone of the Court’s press references, of course,
sends a strong message about its understanding of the value of the press in
our society. But how often the Court mentions the press also affects this
message by amplifying (through a high number of references) or negating
(through a low number) the impact of these characterizations. We therefore
focus on these same two factors to examine the relative press-friendliness
of the individual Justices.
We first analyzed tone by assigning a “Press Support Score” to every
Justice who authored 50 or more total mentions in the dataset.90 We
calculated the Press Support Score by looking at how much above or below
89

See discussion, supra, in Part IV.
This is approximately equivalent to the 60th percentile. We concluded that we had
insufficient data to analyze the positive to negative ratios for the Justices with fewer than
50 mentions. As an example, the Justice with the most mentions who was not included in
this calculation was Chief Justice John Roberts, who had 48 paragraphs.
90
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average a Justice was on three measures: (a) percent positive
characterizations, (b) percent negative characterizations, and (c) the ratio of
positive to negative characterizations. We then rescaled these scores from
0 to 100, assigning the Justice with the highest raw Press Support Score,
Justice George Sutherland, a score of 100 and the Justice with the lowest,
Justice Tom Clark, a score of zero.91
Yet the ratio of a Justice’s positive to negative references does not
fully capture the influence of a Justice’s discussions about the press. As we
have discussed above, how often a Justice chooses to speak about the press,
its role in society, or its value to democracy is likewise impactful. Each
time a Justice finds an opportunity to communicate a view of the press, the
effect of their characterizations, whether positive or negative, is magnified.
We therefore also ranked each Justice based on the number of times he or
she referenced the press. Our data show that Justice William Brennan was
the most frequent commentator on the press with 646 mentions.92 On the
other end of the spectrum are Justices who ranked very low on the
frequency scale, including three who authored only a single paragraph
referencing the press.93 Indeed, 20 of the 114 total Justices to serve on the
Court never once characterized the press.94
Because we limited our Press Support Score ranking pool to Justices
who had at least 50 mentions in our dataset, however, we included only this
same set of Justices for our analysis of the most or least press-friendly
members of the Court. This means that all of the Justices we considered for
these rankings were in roughly the top 40 percent of Justices based on
frequency.
Figure *35* shows how these two factors work together to reveal our
most press-friendly and least press-friendly Justices. In this Figure, we have
plotted these forty-one Justices based on their frequency of press mentions
91

Based on their Press Support Scores alone, we find that the second most positive Justice
was the first Justice John Harlan, who had a press support score of 95. He was followed by
Justice Hugo Black at 94, Justice William Brandeis at 92, and Justice Arthur Goldberg at
89. Justice Felix Frankfurter was the second most negative Justice with a press support
score of 7, followed by Justice Mahlon Pitney at 14, Justice Byron White at 19, and Justice
Robert Jackson at 22. But to stress again, we did not calculate Press Support Scores for
Justices who had less than 50 paragraphs in our dataset.
92 Justice Brennan was followed by Justice Byron White with 628 paragraphs, Justice
William Douglas with 599, Justice Warren Burger with 494, and Justice Black with 479.
93
These were Chief Justice John Marshall, Associate Justice Samuel Chase and Justice
Charles Evans Whittaker.
94 Justices Moore, Duvall, Livingston, Jackson, Campbell, Blair, Byrnes, Iredell, Jay,
McKinley, Rutledge II, Wilson, Ellsworth, Barbour, Trimble, Chase, and Johnson, Todd,
Cushing, and Paterson. Many of these Justices served in the 1700s and early 1800s, when
the issue did not emerge factually and the Court’s opinions were much more concise But
seven of the 20 had opinions classified as First Amendment opinions by the Supreme
Court Database,
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(x-axis)95 and their Press Support Score (y-axis). The dashed line indicates
the median for each factor. The further above the median Press Support line
a Justice appears, the more press-friendly he or she is and vice versa. The
further to the right of the median press frequency line a Justice appears, the
more often he or she mentions the press, while those to the left are lessfrequent commentators.
The first quadrant, in the upper-right-hand corner, showing high
frequency and strong Press Support Scores, indicates our most pressfriendly Justices—those who both spoke often about the press and, when
they did so, were more likely to speak positively. We find that the most
press-friendly Justices of all time were Justice Hugo Black, Justice William
Douglas, and Justice William Brennan. The least press-friendly Justice,
found in the fourth quadrant in the lower-right-hand corner—with the
negative combination of high frequency yet the lowest Press Support
Score—was Justice Byron White.
A few things stand out about these particular Justices emerging as our
free-press “heroes” and “villain.” The first is the length of time they served
on the Court. All four Justices are among the top longest-serving Justices
of all time—Justice Douglas currently ranks as the longest-serving Justice,
Justice Black as the fifth, Justice Brennan as the seventh, and Justice White
as the twelfth. The length of these Justices’ tenures exposes a limitation of
relying too heavily on the frequency of press mentions alone. The longer a
Justice serves on the Court, of course, the more opportunities he or she has
to speak about the press. Some Justices had exceedingly short stints on the
bench96 and others only recently took their seats,97 which means that their
opportunities to characterize the press might not have been as plentiful as
those with longer periods on the Court. Our findings indicate, however, that
the bare fact of having served on the Court for a longer does not result in
increased frequency of press mentions. Some Justices with long tenures did
not even make our cut of having at least 50 press mentions. Chief Justice
John Marshall, for example, is the fourth longest-serving Justice to date,
but in his 34 years on the Court had only a single reference to the press.98
95

The x-scale presents the natural logarithm of the number of press mentions in our data.
Logging our values removes the skewness in the distribution introduced by the presence of
a number of Justices with very large numbers of press mentions. For example, the
minimum in the graphed data is 50 mentions and the maximum is 646 mentions, such that
there is roughly a 13x discrepancy between the two raw values. The logged values are 3.9
and 6.5, respectively, which is only about a 1.7x discrepancy.
96 Justice Thomas Johnson, for example, served for the shortest amount of time to date, a
mere 163 days, before he retired due to poor health.
97 Justice Neil Gorsuch, confirmed in 2017, and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, confirmed in
2018, currently rank among the ten shortest-serving Justices.
98 Associate Justice Samuel Chase, who served for 15 years from 1796 to 1811, also had
only one press reference.
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For similar reasons, we believe that the time periods in which these
Justices served are equally telling. All four of these Justices were on the
Court during at least part of the period in which the Court decided the bulk
of the cases most affecting the press. In fact, all four Justices served on the
bench together for the nine years from 1962, when Justice White joined the
Court, to 1971, when Justice Black stepped down. Our data show that these
years, which spanned the end of the Warren Court era and the beginning of
the Burger Court, were near the height for the number of press mentions
overall. Our press-friendly heroes, furthermore, served together for fifteen
years from 1956 to 1971—a period that is part of the most press-heavy era
for the Court. Still, this does not mean that all the Justices who served
during this time period were high-frequency Justices. Justice Felix
Frankfurter, for example, served all twenty-three years of his tenure on the
bench with Justices Black and Douglas, yet he contributed fewer than half
as many press mentions.99

B. Most Press-Friendly Justices of All Time
Why, then, did Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan rise to the top of
our press-friendliness rankings? Again, the time period they served surely
played a role. These Justices were all on the bench during at least part of
the Court’s press freedom “Glory Days” in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Not
only was this a period when the Court decided a lot of cases that were
related to the press, but it was, as our tone data show,100 also the height of
press-positivity. Thus these Justices may have simply been part of a propress wave sweeping the Court and the country.101 Yet not all Justices from
this time period received a high Press Support Score. As is discussed further
below, our least press-friendly Justice, Justice White, also served during
this era. Likewise, Justice Frankfurter, who was previously mentioned as
serving all of his tenure with Justices Douglas and Black, had a Press
Support Score of only 7. Instead, an examination of the writings of Justices
Black, Douglas and Brennan and their individual data from our study
together suggest that they are the most press-friendly Justices not simply
because they happened to serve during a particularly press-positive time,
but rather because they were, in fact, the Court’s leaders in the recognition
of the valuable roles the press plays and the importance of press freedom.
Many already know Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan as First
Amendment lions and celebrated advocates for the protection of expressive
99

Justice Douglas had 599 paragraphs, Justice Black had 279, and Justice Frankfurter had
171.
100 See, supra, Part IV.B.
101 Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans' Trust in the Mass Media, GALLUP (April 20, 2004),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/11428/americans-trust-mass-media.aspx (noting the high
levels of public trust in the news media in the early 1970s).
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freedoms. But our data confirm that they were also great allies to the press.
Justice Black earned the highest Press Support Score among the Justices
who were above the median frequency line in Figure 35 and the third
highest overall. During his time on the bench, Justice Black found many
opportunities to praise the press, as seen in Figure 36. He frequently made
positive references to the press, authoring 229 positive characterizations.
He had an overall positivity rate of 48 percent, while his negativity rate was
a mere 8 percent. He was also the fifth most-frequent press commentator in
our dataset with 479 mentions.
Justice Douglas had the highest overall positivity rate of any Justice
in our dataset with fully half of his press mentions being positive, as Figure
37 shows, while his negativity rate was only 12 percent. He was our third
most frequent press commentator with 599 mentions. His Press Support
Score of 83, meanwhile, was the second highest among the Justices who
came in above the median frequency line and the seventh highest overall.
He authored exactly 300 positive mentions, compared to his only 73
negative ones.
Our last press-friendly hero, Justice Brennan, was the most prolific
Justice in our dataset with an incredible 646 press mentions. He earned a
Press Support Score of 76, which put him in third place among the Justices
who were above the median frequency line and eleventh overall. As seen
in Figure 38, more than 40 percent of Justice Brennan’s characterizations
were positive, while only 15 percent were negative.
Our heroes climbed to the top of the press-friendly charts through a
variety of paths. To start, they racked up their frequency scores by taking
opportunities to write separately in concurrences and dissents in addition to
authoring opinions of the Court. These separate writings, moreover, like
their majority opinions, were often filled with positive-heavy mentions,
which improved their Press Support Scores. They also were often the most
frequent users of the more positive-leaning frames like the Regulation
Frame, Democracy Frame, and History Frame.
Our heroes were our top three Justices to use the Regulation Frame in
a positive manner, with Justice Douglas employing it an astounding 184
times and Justices Brennan and Black close behind with 146 and 133
positive mentions. Famous for their roles as two of the only First
Amendment absolutists in the Court’s history, Justices Black and Douglas
tolerated few restrictions on press freedom and often advocated for more
press protection than even their other press-friendly brethren—viewpoints
that boosted their numbers under the Regulation Frame.
Concurring in New York Times v. Sullivan, for example, Justice Black
wrote that the Constitution required that the press have “an absolute
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immunity for criticism of the way public officials do their public duty.”102
While Sullivan is widely celebrated for the broad protection it provides to
working journalists, Justice Black made clear that he did not think it went
far enough in protecting the press from legal restrictions, writing three years
later in Curtis Publishing v. Butts that the Sullivan actual-malice rule “is
wholly inadequate to save the press from being destroyed by libel
judgments.”103 This approach to thinking about government regulation of
the press likely explains why Justice Black only wrote negatively under the
Regulation Frame (i.e. in favor of press regulation of any kind) a mere 7
percent of the time.
The Court’s other well-known First Amendment absolutist, Justice
Douglas, also turned to the Regulation Frame to condemn government
interference with the autonomy of the press. Like Justice Black, he
concurred separately in Sullivan and declared that the press has a
constitutional right to “express its view on matters of public concern, and
may not be barred from speaking or publishing because those in control of
government think that what is said or written is unwise, unfair, false, or
malicious.”104
Justice Brennan is perhaps most associated in the minds of First
Amendment scholars as the author of the Court’s opinion in Sullivan, the
seminal 1964 case which transformed the law of defamation and ushered in
the press’s Glory Days period at the Court. He also often wrote in the
unusually high number of cases that followed Sullivan about the need for
constitutional protections against defamation lawsuits. In Sullivan he
explained why the First Amendment requires a public official to show
actual malice in order to succeed in a libel suit and specifically talked about
the importance of protecting the press. Using the Regulation and
Democracy Frames he wrote that “[w]hether or not a newspaper can survive
a succession of such judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon
those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which
the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.”105
Perhaps unsurprisingly, our heroes also took the top three medals for
their use of the highly positive Democracy Frame. Justice Brennan was the
highest in this area with 54 mentions, followed by Douglas with 45 and
Black with 30 positive references. In Mills v. Alabama,106 for example,
Justice Black called the public’s attention to the democracy-enhancing
functions of the press, such as enhancing public debate and serving as a
102

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
104 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 298-99 (Goldberg. J concurring).
105 Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
106 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
103
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government watchdog. When explaining in Mills why an Alabama law that
led to the arrest of the newspaper editor was unconstitutional, he wrote that
the press “serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials, and as a constitutionally chosen
means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the
people whom they were selected to serve.”107 We see him turn to the
Democracy Frame again in his concurrence in New York Times Co. v.
United States (the “Pentagon Papers case”)108 where he wrote at length
about the structural and societal value of the press109 and famously declared
that “[t]he press was to serve the governed, not the governors.”110 Justice
Douglas was also a fan of the Democracy Frame, writing in United States
v. Caldwell, one of the consolidated cases in which the Court held that there
is no First Amendment right to a reporter’s privilege in criminal grand jury
proceedings, that the press “has a preferred position in our constitutional
scheme, not to enable it to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a
favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the public’s right to know.”111
Justice Brennan was the top positive user of the Judicial Systems
Frame, a mixed frame that often captures the Justices’ views on the news
media’s negative impact on the fair trial rights of criminal defendants. But
Justice Brennan set himself apart from many of the other Justices by also
applying the Judicial System Frame positively to emphasize the importance
to the public of having vigorous press coverage of the judicial process. In a
concurrence in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, a case challenging a judge’s
gag order on the press in a high-profile criminal case, he wrote that “free
and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning
of the entire criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that
system by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public
accountability.”112
Our heroes also often made a point to reference the historical
importance of press freedom. Justice Black was our top positive user of the
History Frame and wrote frequently of the unique historical role of press
protections. In the Pentagon Papers case, for example, he declared, “the
Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill
its essential role in our democracy.”113 He also spoke about press freedom
107

Id.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
109 See id. (“Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in
government.”)
110 Id.
111 United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972).
112 Id.
113 New York Times Co., 403 U.S.
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as more than an abstract idea and specifically praised the practical day-today work of the journalists of his time, observing in 1971 that “far from
deserving condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New York
Times, the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended
for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In
revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam War, the
newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted
they would do.”114
Justice Douglas was the second most frequent user of positive
mentions under the History Frame. Combined with his absolutist positions,
he would push the other Justices (and, at times, even the press advocates)
toward more robust protections for press freedom. In his dissent in
Caldwell, for example, he expressed amazement that The New York
Times—the defendant, reporter Earl Caldwell’s, employer—would
concede that the government could compel a journalist’s testimony under
any circumstances. Relying on the Regulation and History Frames, he
stated: “My belief is that all of the ‘balancing’ was done by those who wrote
the Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute terms, they
repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First
Amendment which both the Government and the New York Times advance
in the case.”115
As we discussed earlier, the Right Frame is a typically neutral frame
that nonetheless has a special importance for tracking the frequency in
which the Justices even acknowledge the existence of the constitutional
right. It is significant, therefore, that our press-friendliest Justices often
used the Right Frame, taking the top three spots for neutral uses of it with
Justice Black in first place with 132 neutral mentions and Justices Douglas
and Brennan in second and third with 102 and 77 references. But they did
more than merely note the First Amendment right of press freedom, they
also spoke of it with heightened importance more often than any other
Justices—sweeping the category of positive Right mentions with Justice
Black making 37 references, followed by Justices Douglas and Brennan
with 27 and 25. While we have focused in this article on the press-positive
“Glory Days” of the late-twentieth century, these Justices’ frequent
inclusion of references to the constitutional right is in keeping with what
David Anderson calls the “heyday of the Press Clause in the Supreme
Court” during the 1930s to 1960s in which “the Court invoked the Press
Clause in many cases and appeared to rely on it, rather than the Speech
Clause, to protect freedom of the press.”116 Justices Black and Douglas both
joined the Court in the late-1930s and served into the 1970s.
114
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Caldwell, 408 U.S. at 713.
116 David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 448 (2002).
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Our press-friendliest Justices rose to the top through a combination of
factors. Serving long-tenures during a time period when the Court was
actively considering the contours of press freedom was no doubt part of the
equation. But our data reveal that these three Justices took (and often made)
opportunities to speak about the press even when their colleagues did not.
And when they spoke about the press, they framed these discussions in
press-positive ways by shining a bright light on the crucial roles a free press
fills in our society today and the unique historical and democracyenhancing values protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of press
freedom.

C. History’s Least Press-Friendly Justice
Conversely, Justice Byron White is our least press friendly Justice of
all time. During his time on the Court, he authored a staggering 234
negative depictions of the press. Justice White’s Press Support Score is only
19, meaning he ranked 37 out of 41 in our analysis.117 Yet he wrote about
the press often and thus came in second in frequency with 628 mentions of
which only 22 percent were positive, while 37 percent were negative.
As seen in Figure 39, Justice White often employed the negativeleaning frames. He came in at the top of the list of Justices who negatively
discussed the press under the Trustworthiness Frame, with more than half
of his characterizations of reliability and ethics of the press being negative.
He was the Justice most likely to speak negatively of the press’s impact on
individuals—a step he took more than twice as often as the second most
negative Justice in this category. He depicted the press as harmful to
individual people 85 percent of the time he used the Individuals Frame.
While the press-friendly heroes turned to the Regulation Frame as a
common method for conveying positive characterizations, Justice White
led the pack in his negative use of it, with almost three times more
references in which he spoke approvingly of regulations on the press than
the Justice next behind him on this list. Writing for the Court in Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., for example, Justice White held that Federal
Communication Commission’s implementation against the broadcast
media of the Fairness Doctrine and other regulations “fall short of
abridgment of the freedom of speech and press.”118
When invoking the History Frame—used almost exclusively with a
positive tone for the entirety of the Court’s history—White was negative
50 percent of the time. He tied for first place when it came to making an
117

Justice White came in 17 out of 20 among the Justices above the median frequency
line.
118 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969).
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affirmatively negative statement about the historical value of the press. In
upholding the execution of a search warrant on a university student
newspaper’s newsroom, for example, Justice White expressed skepticism
that the Framers intended for the Constitution to provide the press
protection in such situations, writing that they “did not forbid warrants
where the press was involved, did not require special showings that
subpoenas would be impractical, and did not insist that the owner of the
place to be searched, if connected with the press, must be shown to be
implicated in the offense being investigated.”119
Like the three Justices who emerged as the most press friendly, White
both served on the Court during a period when a significant number of
press-focused cases were on the Court’s docket and had a longer than
average tenure on the Court,120 and thus his frequency score benefited from
more total opportunities to opine about the press and its role. But unlike his
top-ranking press-friendly peers, White was working against the powerful
gravitational pull of a Court inclined toward press positivity, which makes
his exceptionally low Press Support ranking and overall negativity total all
the more notable. Many of Justice White’s press references were in
majority opinions he authored that were signed by significantly more pressfriendly peers and thus likely had to be tempered to hold their votes. With
so many colleagues so eagerly engaged in purposeful press praise, Justice
White stands out for not being more regularly aligned with that positivity.121
That he authored enough press-critical material to overcome the weight of
these Glory Days characterizations is striking.
And, indeed, the record of Justice White’s press-focused opinions
reflects this active pessimism for the specialness of the press function. He
penned several of the most notable rejections of press protectiveness in the
Court’s history. In Branzburg v. Hayes,122 Justice White wrote for a fiveto-four Court that reporters could not invoke any First Amendment
privilege to protect their confidential sources when subpoenaed,123
indicating that “newsmen are not exempt from the normal duty of appearing
119

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978).
Spanning 31 years, White’s tenure on the Court is the twelfth longest in history.
121 Indeed, in at least some prominent instances, Justice White’s votes sided with the press.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that the injunction against the press in the Pentagon Papers cases
was unconstitutional); Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring) (arguing against government interference with the editorial decisions of
newspapers).
122 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
123 Id. at 709 (“[P]etitioner must appear before the grand jury to answer the questions put
to him, subject, of course, to the supervision of the presiding judge as to ‘the propriety,
purposes, and scope of the grand jury inquiry and the pertinence of the probable testimony.’”).
120
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before a grand jury and answering questions relevant to a criminal
investigation.”124 Press organizations had argued that, in practice, a system
that precludes journalists from promising confidentiality at the time of
newsgathering deters important informants from coming forward, stifles
the publication of crucial matters of public concern, and undermines the
historical independence of the press by conscripting reporters as
government investigators, in conflict with the First Amendment’s
protection for freedom of the press.125 But White dismissed these arguments
as “speculative”126 or wrong,127 calling the burden on newsgathering
“uncertain”128 and finding that those who gather and produce the news are
no different than the “average citizen,” who must “disclos[e] to a grand jury
information that he has received in confidence.”129 White took the occasion
to speak broadly of the ways that reporters have no constitutional
specialness.130
In Cohen v. Cowles Media131 and Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,132 Justice
White pounded home this theme. In Cohen, he reject an argument that a
reporter should be exempt from claims of promissory estoppel rooted in the
publication of a truthful story and wrote—again for a narrow majority—
that “generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news.”133 Four of his colleagues on the Court
feared the free press would be dangerously curbed by punishment of
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Id.at 685.
Id. at 679–81; See also Id. at 743 (Stewart, J. dissenting) (agreeing with press
organizations and arguing that there should be a qualified reporter’s privilege: “[W]hen a
reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal confidences, I would hold that
the government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate
that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of
First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the
information.”).
126 Id. at 694 (“Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of
informants to make disclosure to newsman are widely divergent and to a great extent
speculative”).
127 Id. at 698 (“We are admonished that refusal to provide First Amendment report’s
privilege will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news. But this
is not the lesson that history teaches us.”).
128 Id. at 674 (“Any adverse effect upon the free dissemination of news by virtue of petitioner's being called to testify was deemed to be only ‘indirect, theoretical, and uncertain’”).
129 Id. at 682.
130 Id. at 684–85 (“Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime
or disaster when the general public is excluded”).
131 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
132 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
133 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
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“important political speech”134 and highlighted the “importance … to
public discourse” of the press’s work,135 but Justice White found nothing
warranting distinct protection for that function.136 In Zurcher, he rejected
arguments that a newsroom should be constitutionally protected from
police searches for journalist work product, suggesting that “surely a
warrant to search newspaper premises for criminal evidence . . . carries no
threat of prior restraint or any direct restraint whatsoever on the publication
. . . or on its communication of ideas.”137
The press lost at the hands of Justice White in other contexts, as well.
In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier,138 he wrote for a majority that dealt a blow to
student journalists, rejecting their challenge to a content-based deletion of
stories from their public school newspaper and holding that “educators are
entitled to exercise greater control over this” form of expression for
pedagogical purposes.139 In Herbert v. Lando,140 he authored the opinion
rejecting a television producer’s First Amendment claim to an editorial
privilege that would have barred pretrial discovery questions related to
actual malice, leaving members of the press vulnerable to costly defense
against extensive discovery and sweeping inquiries on their knowledge or
reckless falsity in a libel suit.141
While these more explicit examples of Justice White’s anti-press
jurisprudence have not escaped notice, and his reputation as a pressfreedom skeptic has been widely noted,142 our empirical findings indicate
that White’s disapproval of the press—and cynicism for its protected role—
extended beyond these high-profile doctrinally significant examples.
134

Id. at 675 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 678 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136 See id. at 670 (holding that “enforcement of such general laws against the press is not
subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or
organizations” and listing other areas of generally applicable laws).
137 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567.
138 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
139 Id. at 271.
140 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
141 Id. at 172 (“Those who publish defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability,
however, are subject to liability, the aim being not only to compensate for injury but also
to deter publication of unprotected material threatening injury to individual reputation.
Permitting plaintiffs such as Herbert to prove their cases by direct as well as indirect
evidence is consistent with the balance struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results
in liability for damages which in turn discourages the publication of erroneous information
known to be false or probably false, this is no more than what our cases contemplate and
does not abridge either freedom of speech or of the press.”).
142 Michael J. Armstrong, A Barometer of Freedom of the Press: Opinions of Mr. Justice
White, VOL. 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 157, 179 – 185 (Dec. 15, 1980) (“White has chosen to
view common law principles as restricting the first amendment to a protection of political
criticism and from prior restraint.”); Bernard W. Bell, The Populism of Justice Byron R.
White: Media Cases and Beyond, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1425, 1464 (2003).
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Justice White’s role as counter-voice in the otherwise press-friendly Glory
Days was not confined to press cases but instead permeated his wider tenure
on the Court.143 Significantly, although a number of his press-specific
holdings might be characterized as merely declining to extend additional
protections to the press,144 the total coding of his references reveals the
heavy presence of overtly negative characterizations of the press. When
combined with his exceptional frequency of press characterization, this low
press support makes him the clear historical standout for press
unfriendliness.

D. Current Justices’ Attitudes about the Press
Among the current Justices of the Court,145 it is much harder to
perform analyses of the sort we conducted on the wider historical set—
both because, as discussed in detail above, the frequency of press
references has so precipitously plummeted in recent years and because
two of the nine Justices have joined the Court so recently that they have
had a particularly shallow pool of opportunities for press characterization.
Thus, for one reason or another, most of the current Justices are so
rarely speaking about the press that there simply are not enough data
points to allow us to compare their positivity, negativity, and neutrality
toward the press to any statistically significant degree. Indeed, four of the
nine Justices who participated in the 2019 term do not have the requisite
50 references to the press needed in order to be included in our Press
Support scoring system comparing them to the other Justices throughout
history. Among those that do make that cut, only Justice Clarence
Thomas, the longest serving of the current Justices, has authored more
than 150 mentions.146 All of the other sitting Justices have 85 or fewer
total references to the press in their entire body of published writing on
the Court. Three of these—Justice Kagan and the two newcomers,
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White, VOL. 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 157, 162–71 (Dec. 15, 1980). See generally New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
144 Markus E. Apelis, Fit to Print – Consequences of Implementing a Federal Reporter’s
Privilege, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1369, 1373–74 (2008).
145
The data collection in this study concluded in July 2020, with the full set of cases from
the Court’s October 2019 Term. Thus, it does not include any analysis of opinions authored by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, who was confirmed to the Court on Oct. 26, 2020.
In the interest of completeness, this section includes analysis of all nine Justices who sat
on the Court in the last studied term, including Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who died on
Sept. 18, 2020.
146 Justice Thomas has a total of 169 mentions of the press in his nearly 29 years on the
Court.
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Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh—have spoken of the press or the press
function fewer than ten times.147
Nevertheless, an investigation of the frequency, frames, and tones of
press characterizations for each of these current Justices offers some
insights into the ways that the trends described elsewhere in this Article
may be playing out on the present-day Court. It also helps reveal the areas
in which particular Justices may shape the judicial characterizations of the
press in the years to come.
1. Trends on the Current Court
The data reveal that the two most frequent characterizers of the press
on the current Court are the two Justices at its ideological extremes—a
result that is wholly consistent with the wider findings on the historical
relationships between ideological poles and frequency of press
commentary.148 Justice Sonia Sotomayor is the current Court’s most
liberal member, with a 2019 Martin-Quinn score of -3.48, and, when the
Justices are compared by their averages per year served on the Court, she
is ranked first among the sitting Justices for frequency of press mentions.
In her 11 years on the Court, she has referenced the press or a press
function 68 times, for an average of 6.09 references per year. In second
place is the Court’s current most conservative member, Justice Clarence
Thomas, with a 2019 Martin-Quinn score of 3.69. He has discussed the
press or a press function 169 times in his nearly 29 years on the Court, for
an average of 5.83 references per year. By contrast, Justice Brennan, the
most frequent press mentioner in our full dataset, characterized the press
more than 19 times per year—more than three times more often than the
most active commenters on the current Court. The least frequent
referencer of the press on the current Court is Justice Elena Kagan, with
just six total mentions in more than a decade as a Justice, which translates
to an average of .59 mentions per year.
At least some of the other recent notable trends on the relationship
between ideology and press mention also manifest themselves in the data
from the current Court. For example, there is no discernible pattern
linking judicial ideology and press positivity, which seems to reflect the
disappearing connection between ideology and press positivity seen in the
longer trend studies. The two Justices with the highest percentage of
positive press references are Justice Thomas, the Court’s most
conservative Justice,149 and Chief Justice Roberts, the Court’s median

147

Kagan has spoken of the press 10 total times. Gorsuch has four mentions and
Kavanaugh has two.
148 See infra, Part IV.
149 Justice Thomas’s references to the press have been positive 29 percent of the time.
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Justice on the Martin-Quinn scale,150 both of whom have nearly 30
percent positivity. The next two most positive Justices, however, are the
Court’s third most liberal151 and second most conservative152 Justices, all
of which suggests the strong left-right correlation that once existed on
overt press positivity has vanished.
Perhaps most notably, the two Justices with the highest percentage of
references that are neutral in tone are two of the recent Court’s most
liberal Justices, Justices Ginsburg153 and Breyer,154 whose total press
characterizations over the course of their tenures have been 68 percent
and 62 percent neutral, respectively. The gravitational pull away from
positivity about the press and toward liberal jurist neutrality is
unambiguously illustrated when we compare their tonal characterizations
with those of the leftmost Justices of a half-century ago. While Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer negatively characterized the press relatively rarely—
and only slightly more often than press-freedom heroes Brennan, Black,
and Douglas—they positively characterized the press drastically less
often. Put another way, while both the current-day liberals and the liberals
from a fifty years ago all have positive or neutral characterizations of the
press in approximately four-fifths or more of their mentions,155 the subset
of those mentions that are overtly positive has nose-dived. Justices
Brennan, Black, and Douglas all had positive rates that were close to or
exceeding their neutral rates,156 but Justice Breyer has three times as many
neutral references as positive ones and Justice Ginsburg has six times as
many.157 Indeed, these modern liberal Justices shied away from positive
characterizations of the press in favor of neutral ones to such an extent
that their overall positivity percentages are lower than that of our least
press-friendly Justice of all time, Justice Byron White.158

Chief Justice Roberts’s Martin-Quinn score in 2019 was +.216. His total references to
the press over his 15 years on the Court have been positive 27 percent of the time.
151 Justice Breyer’s Martin-Quinn score in 2019 was -1.87. His total references to the press
over 26 years on the Court have been positive 20 percent of the time.
152 Justice Alito’s Martin-Quinn score in 2019 was +2.05. His total references to the press
over his nearly 15 years on the Court have been positive 19 percent of the time.
153 Justice Ginsburg’s Martin-Quinn score for 2019 was -2.82, the second most liberal.
154 Justice Breyer’s was -1.87, making him the third most liberal.
155 Justice Ginsburg is positive or neutral a total of 79 percent of the time; Justice Breyer
82 percent. Justice Brennan was positive or neutral 85 percent of the time; Justice Douglas
87 percent; Justice Black 92 percent.
156 Justice Douglas’s overall positive-neutral mix was 50-37 percent. Justice Black’s was
48-44 percent. Justice Brennan’s was 43-42 percent.
157 Justice Ginsburg’s overall positive-neutral mix was 11-68 percent. Justice Breyer’s is
20-62 percent.
158 Justice White characterized the press positively 21 percent of the time. Justice Breyer
has done so 20 percent of the time and Justice Ginsberg just 11 percent of the time.
150

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3787709

February 2021 Draft: Please do not cite

45

2. Observations about the Current Justices
Although the overall numbers of references are small, an
examination of the data reveals some interesting tendencies about the
current Justices.
The most recent appointees to the Court have done almost nothing to
give us insight into the views on the press—but certainly do not seem
inclined to reach out to discuss either the press or the press function. See
Figures 40 and 41. Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s two years on the Court have
produced only two references to the press, both in the Regulation Frame,
one positive and one negative. Justice Neil Gorsuch, who has been on the
Court three and a half years, has only referred to the press four times, all
of which were neutral Communication Frame depictions of the bare fact
of the press as an information delivery mechanism. Thus, although the
data is exceptionally limited—and these Justices could ramp up in the
aggressiveness of their frequency, their positivity, or their negativity—at
the moment, neither seems poised to actively contribute to the body of
press characterizations.
On the other side of the spectrum is Justice Clarence Thomas, whose
strong pace of press characterizations not only ranks among the highest
frequency on the current Court, as discussed above, but also carries
distinctive content themes that make a unique mark on the Court’s overall
set of press mentions. As Figure 42 shows, he is a major contributor to the
overall number of references within the Right Frame, which captures
references to “the freedom of the press.” He has made 28 such references
over the course of his time on the Court—more than five times as many as
were made by any of his contemporaries.159 He most often references the
constitutional right neutrally, simply by naming the freedom without
praising the right as special or important,160 which could be due to his
tendency to more fully and directly quote the First Amendment’s text.
Even more idiosyncratic is Justice Thomas’s invocation of the
History Frame, which characterizes the press by reference to the views of
the Founders. He is the only member of the current Court to invoke the
frame at any time; none of his colleagues has referenced the historical role
of the press even once in their entire tenures on the Court. With only 157
references in total, the frame is relatively rare over the course of the full
235-year data set. Yet Justice Thomas generated 21 of those references.
Even more astoundingly, although this frame has the overall highest
positivity ratio of any frame, with only 8 percent of its total hits coded as
159

Justices Roberts and Ginsburg have each used the Right Frame five times. Justices
Alito and Breyer have used it four times. Justice Kagan has used it once, and Justices
Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh have never used it.
160 Twenty-four of his 28 references were neutral.
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negative in tone, nearly one in every five uses of it by Justice Thomas are
negative.161 Indeed, Justice Thomas personally accounts for 31 percent of
the entire dataset’s tonally negative depictions of the press’s position in
the founding era. He currently is tied with our least press-friendly Justice
of all time, Justice White, for having the most instances of invoking the
views of the Founders against rather than in favor of the press.
In addition to this uncommon negativity in the predominantly
positive History Frame, Justice Thomas has displayed powerful negativity
in his use of the Individuals Frame—where 100 percent of his references
suggest the press is harmful to individual people—and in the
Trustworthiness Frame—where 89 percent of his references suggest the
press lacks credibility and ethics. Yet despite all of this, his overall tone
ratio is more positive than any other member of the Court. Thirty percent
of his total mentions were positive. Fifty-one percent were neutral, and 19
percent were negative. Justice Thomas’s use of positive History Frame
references, coupled with his heavily positive use of the Regulation Frame,
account for much of the positivity.162
Despite being on the Court nearly as long, the late Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg took far fewer opportunities to reference the press or the
press function than Justice Thomas. Figure 43 shows that she made only
72 total characterizations of the press during her 27 years as a Justice, for
an average of 2.65 per year. Forty-two percent of these were neutral
references within the Communication Frame, which means she simply
factually conveyed, without more, that the press functioned as a
communicator or made something known.163 Her overall positivity ratio is
just 11 percent, contributing to a Press Support score of 61, which is just
below the median. See Figure 35. While Justice Ginsburg’s exceptionally
small number of references within the Democracy Frame and the
Regulation Frame were heavily positive,164 they were outweighed by
many more references within the Judicial System Frame, where Justice
Ginsburg had a much more mixed characterization of the press. Ten of her
22 total mentions of the press’s impact on the operation of courts and the
justice system cast the press in a negative light; the remaining 12 were
neutral, such that she never once stated or suggested that the press might
have a positive role in coverage of trials. In nearly three decades on the
high court, she referenced the “freedom of the press” and related concepts
Justice Thomas’s negativity rate within the frame is 19.05 percent.
Seventy-one percent of his 21 History Frame references were positive. Sixty-one
percent of his 38 Regulation Frame references were positive.
163 Communications Frame references accounted for 30 of Justice Ginsburg’s 72 frames.
One hundred percent of these were coded as tonally neutral.
164 Four of five Regulation Frame references were positive. Two of three Democracy
Frame references were positive.
161
162
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only five times, and each of these references was tonally neutral, with the
Justice not ever suggesting that the right was special or valuable.
Justice Stephen Breyer’s record on press characterizations closely
parallels Justice Ginsburg’s in a number of ways. See Figure 44. His
overall frequency of press mentions—85 total mentions in 26 years, for an
average of 3.25 per year—is slightly higher, as is his overall positivity
ratio, with 20 percent of his characterizations taking a positive tone. But
39 percent of his total references over the years have been neutrally toned
Communication Frame mentions,165 merely noting as a factual matter that
the press engaged in some act of public communication. Justice Breyer
occasionally has suggested that the press should be free from regulation166
and, more rarely, that it serves democracy,167 but his tone on
Trustworthiness has been mixed168 and his references to the impact of the
press on the judicial system have been nearly entirely neutral.169 Despite
serving on the Court for more than a quarter century, he has invoked the
principle of “freedom of the press” only four times, and never has done so
in an overtly positive manner.
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, who joined the
Court within four months of each other,170 have similar frequencies of
mentioning the press. Chief Justice Roberts has characterized the press 48
times, falling just shy of the requisite 50 mentions required to be included
in the Press Support scoring pool. At an average of 3.2 references per
year, he is a slightly less frequent referencer of the press than Justice
Alito, who averages 3.68 per year and has characterized the press 54 total
times. Both of them have made a majority of their mentions with tonal
neutrality.171 See Figures 45 and 46.
Where the two diverge is on the negative-positive mix, with Justice
Alito opting for negativity more than twice as often as Chief Justice
Roberts172 and Roberts opting for positivity 27 percent of the time to
Alito’s 19 percent. Chief Justice Roberts has strong positivity mentions in
165

Thirty three of his 85 references were neutral Communications Frame references.
Justice Breyer had 25 references within the Regulation Frame, 11 of which were
positive.
167 Justice Breyer had four references within the Regulation Frame, three of which were
positive.
168 Justice Breyer had three references within the Trustworthiness Frame—one positive,
one neutral, and one negative.
169 Justice Breyer had 11 references within the Judicial System Frame, 10 of which were
neutral.
170 Roberts was confirmed in September 2005. Alito was confirmed in January 2006.
171 Fifty-six percent of Alito’s full set of press references are neutral. Sixty-three percent of
Roberts’s are neutral.
172 Twenty-six percent of Justice Alito’s references are negative. Ten percent of Roberts’s
are negative.
166
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the Regulation Frame and the Democracy Frame,173 which Alito’s record
mirrors.174 But Alito diverges with heavy negativity in the
Trustworthiness Frame, where he uniformly characterizes the press as
inaccurate, unethical, or untrustworthy, and in the Judicial System Frame,
where four of his five mentions have suggested the press does harm.
Justice Alito’s tendencies to speak critically of those facets of the press
place him below the mean in his Press Support Score. See Figure 35,
infra.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor is the Court’s most ideologically liberal
Justice—a factor that once would have predicted strong press positivity.
But with only 12 percent of her press references tonally positive and 32
percent of them negative, her Press Support score is well below the
median. See Figure 47 and Figure 35, infra. As discussed above, like her
predecessors who were at the ideological poles of the Courts on which
they sat, Justice Sotomayor has commented on the press more often than
her fellow Justices; but unlike her predecessor liberal Justices, she has not
done so in ways that favor the press. Her negativity totals are heavily
influenced by negative characterizations of the press’s role in the judicial
system,175 and her use of the negative tone within the Trustworthiness
Frame, where seven of her eight total mentions have suggested that the
press lacks trustworthiness, accuracy, or ethics.
Perhaps the most surprising results for a Justice on the current Court
are those of Justice Elena Kagan. In her previous professional life as a
legal academic, Justice Kagan “worked on free-speech and free-press
issues more than any recent high court nominee,”176 but since joining the
bench she has almost never spoken of the press and freedom of the press.
See Figure 48. In more than a decade on the Supreme Court, she has made
only six total references to the press, three of which were mere
Communication Frame references to the press publishing or otherwise
making widely known a piece of information and one of which was a
negative reference to the harm the press causes to individuals. She has
once neutrally noted the existence of a constitutional right of press
freedom, but has never characterized that right as valuable or important.
Justice Kagan’s frequency is the very lowest among her peers on the
current Court, and even among these rare characterizations, her negativity
Three of Chief Justice Roberts’s four uses of the Democracy Frame were positive. Nine
of his 13 uses of the Regulation Frame were positive.
174 Three of Justice Alito’s four uses of the Democracy Frame were positive. All six of his
uses of the Regulation Frame were positive.
175 Justice Sotomayor characterized the press within the Judicial System frame 26 times,
13 of which were negative and only one of which was positive.
176 See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Elena Kagan, 34 News Media & L. 25,
25 (2010).
173
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outpaces her positivity.177 Nothing about her record on the Court indicates
a propensity to characterize the press at all, let alone to do so favorably.
Thus, although the dataset is too small to permit meaningful
statistical comparisons of the Justices of the current Court—either with
the wider set of Justices throughout history or with each other—a
qualitative examination of their characterizations of the press suggests no
sitting Justice has particular interest in advancing positivity about the
press and that a number of them are either actively undercutting some
characterization frames once dominated by press praise or entirely
avoiding all but the most neutral, bland mentions of the press required by
the facts of the cases before them. Indeed, the fact that there are passing
few references to the press from any Justice of the current Court suggests
that the Court has all but given up on the once common endeavor of
shaping discussion of the press and specifying the value of press functions
in a democracy.

VII. CONCLUSION
The vilification of the press by the political branches—a focus of
significant concern in recent years—is matched by a marked and
previously undocumented uptick in negative depictions of the press by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Our large-scale empirical study shows an especially
stark abandonment of positive judicial depictions of the press in the last
50 years. A generation ago, the Court actively taught the public that the
press was a check on government, a trustworthy source of accurate
coverage, an entity to be specially protected from regulation, and an
institution with specific constitutional freedoms. Today, in contrast, it
almost never speaks of the press, press freedom, or press functions, and
when it does, it is in an overwhelmingly less positive manner.
Given that much of the press’s foundation for a special or protected
societal role has turned on the tenor of the Court’s rhetoric, our findings
make clear that any assumption that the Court is poised to be the branch
that defends the press against disparagement is misplaced. Instead, these
sharply negative tone trends suggest that the judicial road ahead for the
American press will be bumpy. This conclusion is reinforced by our data
on the impact of judicial ideology on the Justices’ attitudes toward the
press, which indicate that conservative Justices are as unlikely as their coideologues in the political spheres to view the press positively. Moreover,
while liberal Justices of a generation ago were the all-time press
friendliest—actively finding opportunities to discuss the press and
Two of JUSTICE Kagan’s six references, or 33 percent, are negative. One reference, 17
percent, is positive. Fifty percent of her mentions are tonally neutral.
177
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aggressively preserving a positive characterization when doing so—this
generation’s liberal Justices appear significantly less poised to take these
opportunities and, instead, are drifting toward more neutral depictions or
toward not discussing the press at all.
All told, in a study of eight frames, three tonal variations, 114
Justices, and more than 8,000 characterizations of the press over the
course of 235 years, there is not a single indicator that bodes well for the
press’s position before the current U.S. Supreme Court.
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